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ABSTRACT

This qualitative research examines senior U.S. Army officer leaders’ propensity and
appreciation to engage in self-devolvement and to develop their junior leaders. The research
compares what the Army is prescribing to its leaders with what they are actually saying and
doing. It focuses on the decade before the Global War on Terrorism, during the high-tempo war
period, and the last ten years. We find that the past 19 years of war have impacted the U.S. Army
in countless ways. One is arguably on its most precious capability—its active officer leaders. As
the Army rose to war-related challenges, it did so at leader-development costs. Little time, focus,
and a battle environment left developing others and oneself low on the list of priorities. Less
officer nurturing in the past will have an amplified and harmful effect in the near and distant
future; unless, of course, the Army understands its self-development state-of-affairs today and
takes action to bolster adult learning. It is no longer a question of if the Army wants to develop
its leadership seed-corn, but if they can.

CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
We don’t know how more difficult leading will become, but we know-for-sure-that
it will become more difficult. We know-for-sure-that it will take more of
everything: more attention, more learning, more effort. (Dempsey & Brafman,
2018, p. 171)
The profession of arms in America strives to be a learning organization (United States
Department of the Army (DA), 2012a, pp. 7–33). It is continuously adapting, relearning, and
transforming to overmatch potential adversaries (Senge, 2010). One cornerstone of this endeavor
is to produce the highest caliber leaders with vision and expertise that lead the body in the
present and better it for the future. Their own doctrine can easily sum up the U.S. Army’s
emphasis of leadership: “leaders are the competitive advantage the Army possesses that
technology cannot replace nor be substituted by advanced weaponry and platforms” (DA, 2015,
p. vi).
This research focuses new attention on a fundamental challenge for America’s Army—
leadership development—more specifically, self-development. Terry McGovern (2009) sums up
both well, “Fundamentally, all development is self-development, and becoming a leader is a
challenging journey of continuous learning and self-development” (p. 39). The Army has
rightfully given much of its effort to the wars in the early 21st century, but at leader development
costs. The amount of time available for self-development alone justifies this, but there is also the
leader’s physical climate to consider (Knowles, 1975). Repeated deployments, which include
resetting from the last while simultaneously preparing for future ones, is a frustrating agenda.
1

Aslanian and Brickells’ (1980) work summarize this and adds a development twist, “To know an
adult’s life schedule, is to know an adult’s learning schedule” (pp. 60–61).
The research and conclusion described herein suggest the Global War on Terrorism, more
specifically, the Army’s efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, have caused a severely reduced ability
to develop current and future officer leaders. This will result in an undesirable leader snowball
effect if not recognized, understood, and ultimately redirected. Given this, the research question
asks: How have 19 years of war impacted the U.S. Army’s leader self-development today; and
perhaps more broadly, how could his influence future leaders for many years to come? The
Army is undoubtedly concerned about the future, as well (U.S. Army, 2014):
It is not enough for leaders to tolerate or even grow comfortable with the
uncertainty described in the future environment. Operating in this complex
environment requires agile, adaptive, and ethical leaders trained and educated to
improve and thrive in uncertainty. These leaders must possess a natural
inclination for disruptive innovation and an abiding sense of urgency both in
times of crisis and times of opportunity. They must be professionals of strong
character, physically supreme, and resilient to overcome the effects of the great
trauma that is the experience of war. The Army must empower Soldiers not only
with exquisite technology, but also with broad cultural understanding,
professional judgment, critical thinking, and technical skills, so that they can
adapt to unforeseen and unpredictable conditions as they emerge. (p. 10)
A crucial aspect of Army soldier-leader improvement is the reliance on self-development,
which is one of three “domains” that makes up the Army Leader Development Model (ALDM)
in Figure 1. The “operational domain” is experience, mentoring, programmed training, and some
unsurprisingly productive on-the-job-training. The “institutional domain” is time spent away
from practice and work, and mainly in formal educational and structured training scenarios. The
third domain is “self-development;” that is largely as it sounds, but it is better known as selfdirected or adult learning in academic literature (DA, 2019, p. 6-1–6-4). The three domains are

designed to complement one another, which is depicted by the overlapping circles in Army
doctrine.

Figure 1. U.S. Army Leader Development Model
Examples of Army self-development include reading military history, manuals, and
professional magazines; taking courses and pursuing higher education during non-duty hours;
foreign language and culture study, and practicing extracurricular physical and mental fitness.
For the Army, the ‘self’ aspect is larger than just hoping officers prepare, and is the research’s
focus (DA, 2012b, p. 1-2). This begs an obvious question: Are individual leaders practicing what
the Army is expecting of them?
Over time, the ALDM and individual leader capacity should have a positive slope. This is
an accumulation of experience, programmed periods of professional training, academic
opportunities, and ever-increasing positions of responsibility. These also coincide with the
Army’s leadership levels: direct, organizational, and strategic; and officer ranks: lieutenant,
captain, major, colonel, and general (DA, 2015, pp. 1–22). The Army’s strong desire is that

mentoring also has some exponential impact on an individual’s proclivity to seek and engage in
self-development (described more in Chapter 2).
1.1 Problem
“[L]eaders must prepare themselves and act to promote long-term stewardship of the
[profession]” according to the Army (DA, 2015, p. 8). Given this strong assertion, a problem
emerged from a 2001 Army study on officer leadership development; it concluded, “Most
officers understand the importance and role of self-development in lifelong learning. However,
[the] Army… does not adequately address it… does not emphasize its value… does not provide
the tools and support to enable its leaders to make self-development an effective component of
lifelong learning” (DA, 2011, p. 11). Nine years later, another research project identified similar
problems and proposed like solutions (Dougherty Jr, 2010). More recent studies see selfdevelopment in a better light (Riley, Cavanaugh, Fallesen, & Jones, 2016); but what if the trend
is skewed by leaders who have little appreciation for learning today and are ill-suited to ‘act to
promote?’ This researcher, a retired officer with 20 years of service, noticed a change in officers
as well.1 This shared observation is not an admonishment, but rather, a curiosity to uncover and
explain. Prior research and the author’s own experience might make the ALDM look more like
Figure 2.
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I am no longer in uniform, but still work around mostly officers as an Army Civilian – 30 years total.

Figure 2. Author’s Perception of the ALDM
The Army organization expects its more senior leaders to guide and foster junior ones
(DA, 2017b, p. 1), or as Brockett and Hiemstra’s (1991) Personal Responsibility Orientation
model would say, “[provide] an educational agent” (p. 24). The Army may have several cohorts
of these leaders that are less capable of fostering self-development in their subordinates. Their
own study admits as much, “If the Army does not commit to the developmental domain of the
profession, the treasure of military experience in its current officers will vanish from its ranks as
people retire or leave the Army” (Adamshick, 2013, p. 22).
Young lieutenants and captains that served between 2001 and 2015 were, and still are, in
constant overseas deployment cycles. More senior leaders in the ranks of majors, lieutenant
colonel, and colonel experienced the same repetitious deployments. These ‘young’ soldiers are
now the senior lieutenant colonels, as well as the higher-ranking colonels and beyond. Figure 3
depicts this by plotting time on both axes’, the war-period, leaders’ service length, and their
associated advance in rank (developed by the author).

Figure 3. Cascading Impact of Time, War and Rank on Self-Development
Another way to think of this is a silencing echo, but in this case, it is a fading ability as
skilled troops leave the ranks. Time, tempo, and the environment take a toll on learning, but
much of the programed training and education was curtailed, if not omitted as well (Aslanian &
Brickell, 1980). What formal learning that did occur needs a caveat: Due to the war and Army
manning levels, many of the “best” uniformed officers were reassigned from the classroom to
deploying units. Class sizes increased as well. Even if the motivation existed to better oneself,
there were more pressing war-related focus areas. In 1980, Gibbons et al. even argued that
formal education might not have much positive impact on self-development (Owen, 2002, p 25).
1.2 Motivation
This research contributes to the Army’s ongoing efforts: The best led and most ready
land-force achievable. The U.S. military exists to defend the Constitution and the American way
of life. Since the stakes are this precious and solemn, the state of self-development in the Army
is that much more important. Is the Army or the United States at risk today—or potentially in the

future? To highlight this, when the Army’s own “War College” asked, “How well does the Army
develop strategic leaders?” its faculty grades were poor. The best grade was a C+, while many
gave an F. One prominent professor captured the overall commentary, “If the U.S. Army did
develop highly skilled strategic leaders, would the Army realize it?” (War Room, 2018).
Historically, the military has risen to many challenges in the relatively short existence of
the US. While most starts were slow and perilous (Heller & Stofft, 1986), the results have proven
their value, since the country remains. Still, longstanding and newer challenges persist, and no
one in the profession can ignore the many calls for more adaptive, hyper-creative, and criticalthinking leaders in military professional magazines, in its doctrine and in online articles (M.
Ryan, 2020, pp. 6–11). Meanwhile, belligerent nation and non-nation state conflicts are making
daily headlines—even talk of nuclear “mutually assured destruction” is becoming in vogue
again.
1.3 Study Significance
For the Army, better realizing its self-development state-of-affairs would be a start. This
can and should lead to justified policy changes and reallocation of resources. The whole force
should improve with time as adult learners reach ever higher degrees of synthesizing information
(Anderson & Bloom, 2001). The Army found itself reflecting after the Vietnam War as well; the
result was a 2,500-page study, which largely set the objectives and path for leader-development
through the late 1990s (Adamshick, 2013, p. 49).
In a larger sense, the world is a dangerous place, and some argue, more complex than
ever before. Newer clashes can be found in space, the web, via social influence, in mega-cites,
and more recently, via artificial intelligence (Greer, 2018). Is one or more of these a potential
Achilles heel for the Nation? Complicating the military landscape for planners are significant

changes to the environment, global socio-economic conditions, and ever-increasing competition
for natural resources. The recent COVID-19 pandemic is an example of shock planners cannot
anticipate in detail. The fragility of nation-states is well documented throughout history, and this
alone should keep self-development at the forefront of leaders’ minds.
All of this will be worse if Army leadership gaps are too wide. The military needs superb
leaders during trying times, and not only in the Army. The same self-development situation
might be resident in the Navy, Air Force, and Marines officer corps. Beyond officers, the more
numerous senior non-commissioned officer corps could be afflicted as well. Ultimately, this
research can expand the body of evidence that attempts to understand and cultivate adult learning
and potentially accelerate the process altogether (Annis, 2016, pp. 116–118).
1.4 Limitations
Researching the U.S. Army is like ‘hitting a moving target’ to use their own aphorism. It
is always changing, and over time, mostly improves via evolution versus some radical
revolution.2 It is also large and unsurprisingly bureaucratic. It has its own study and research
programs, but they do not accommodate independent efforts like this paper. After great effort,
access to many years of raw Army self-development data was not possible. The limitations to the
research are purposefully mentioned now to give the reader some additional context of a
changing Army and officer corps.
Other situations that cannot be controlled for in the methodology are many. Since the
Army is a volunteer force, its numbers and quality ebbs and flows. This is articulated well in the
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This is an ongoing and healthy debate in military circles. Many professional military journals are calling for
‘revolutions’ in this or that. The “Revolution in Military Affairs” pundits point to great leaps in technology and
infrastructure. The iterative side addresses change over longer periods of time, and posit ‘revolutions’ are only
known after the fact, so trying to create one is less useful.

controversial book, “Bleeding Talent: How the US Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why
it’s Time for a Revolution” by Tim Kane (2012). There was an Army-led “Reduction in Force”
(RIF) in the mid-to-late 1990s, and then a leader “exodus” from around 2004 to at least 2010
(Kane, 2012, pp. 86–95). This author admits seeing some of the best and brightest trade boots for
loafers, but not all. Kane also makes a convincing case about the long degradation of officer
entrance standards (read quality) (2012, p. 37-41), which was echoed by a (Army) War College
Strategic Studies Institute book in late 2017 (Coumbe, 2010; Coumbe, Condly, & Skimmyhorn,
2017). The research, therefore, cannot control for overall officer quality.
An effort in the late 1990s changed officers’ careers from a multi-track to a single-track
system (it remains today) (DA, 2019, p. 3). This meant officers only retained one specialized
occupation from the beginning of a career to leaving. Prior to this, officers had several unrelated
skills and moved back and forth between assignments over the years. The idea was to focus an
individual on one thing to become an expert. Although this sounds appropriate, it is
counterintuitive to what the Army eventually wants—officers in the rank of general (generalist),
leading large and diverse organizations. All of these facts impact today’s force, its leaders, and
their sense of the value of self-development.
A less obvious situation is the closure of installation officers’ clubs; it is relevant because
it impacted all officers regardless of rank. These physical spaces were built around in-person
discourse, eating, relaxing, and admittedly some overindulgence in libations. A typical ‘o-club’
had dozens of sitting rooms; there were tables strewn with military professional journals and
newspapers from around the world and bookcases full of history and military autobiographies.
These spaces allowed leaders to play golf, tennis, swim, eat, sit and mostly importantly, talk.
They died a quick death in the late 1990s after alcohol consumption was “deglamorized,” but

mostly because a new venue was set to revolutionize communications and learning—the internet
(and cost savings). The impact of this alone on self-development could be surprisingly large, but
uncontrolled for.
Finally, the Army has launched efforts to address a myriad of leadership challenges.
However, these are ‘works-in-progress,’ albeit welcome. They include a complete overhaul of
the officer evaluation reporting system to better identify and grow superior leaders. A recently
revived 2012 effort by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) called, “The
U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept,” provides a holistic approach to improving what the
Army considers its most crucial resource—its soldiers, civilians, and even their supporting
families (DA, 2014b). Figure 4 attempts to capture the many facets of this complex landscape,
which includes self-development. The authors even endeavor to “accelerate” the entire process
but make a potentially poor or plainly erroneous assumption: “Army professionals will remain
committed to career-long learning and self-development” (DA, 2018, p. 7).

Figure 4. Human Dimension Integration Framework
Also untested is the newly published “Army People Strategy” that outlines objectives to
reform “talent” acquisition, development, employment, and retention by 2028 (Grinston,

McConville, & McCarthy, 2019b, pp. 6–8). This researcher’s friend quipped, “I think I read a
similar strategy back in 2001.” The Army has even introduced the “Innovative Leaders Course”
at its Combined Arms Center, also known as the "Intellectual Center of the Army"
(https://home.army.mil/leavenworth/index.php). Some Army organizations even have dedicated
“initiative groups,” perhaps because the larger body lacks it.
The remainder of the research follows a classical format. The next chapter introduces the
volumes of academic research and generally accepted theories on self-development. The second
half of the chapter highlights Army sources that describe the domain in question and ends with
previous Army-sponsored research and results. Chapter 3 is the methodology used to answer the
research question, while Chapter 4 presents the analysis and some results. The concluding
chapter folds together what the Army wants and what its officers are doing insofar as selfdevelopment, and since they contrast, it offers some recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW
“…you will learn a great deal by a method I call absorption…” Then Major Dwight
Eisenhower’s critique of Army’s past institutional domain. (Runkle, 2019, p. 148)
This chapter provides a macro compilation of papers, books, and articles that reveal the
complex and difficult topic of understanding adult learning. Although some may consider
academia and the military miles apart (and they can be), there is unsurprising continuity in how
both understand and exercise human development: “Leader development generally occurs
through three mechanisms—formal instruction, work assignments, and self-directed learning”
(Boyce, Zaccaro, & Wisecarver, 2010, p. 159). This is essentially the Army’s three domains
mentioned earlier. The Army section of the chapter is purposefully more detailed because that is
the focus of the research.
Self-development is one expression that gains a long following of associated but
interrelated terms in learning and education: tacit, self-directed, self-determination, adult,
informal, collective, lifelong, knowledge-society, and continuing. Most works acknowledge the
individual motivation required and extol the benefits to managers and organizations in the
process. Others provide a more holistic approach to self-development that considers one’s
environment, the organization’s values, and basic physiological needs (Sackett, Karrasch,
Weyhrauch, & Goldman, 2016). A few pieces touch on technology and what that might mean in
the future (Crowley, Shanley, Rothenberg, & Sollinger, 2013; Livingstone, 2006), but it will
likely include artificial intelligence and some personalized learning agenda (Gagné, 2013, pp.

321–326). Most of the papers reviewed gave value to the importance of consciousness or selfawareness in promoting self-development; many of these present a 360-degree-like feedback tool
as one way to assist in achieving this (McCarthy & Garavan, 1999; Merriam & Baumgartner,
2020).
Although the Army championed these holistic self-assessments for many years, the
Secretary of the Army “eliminate[d] the requirement for all noncommissioned officers…, and
civilian leaders to conduct a leader 360 assessment” in an effort to promote readiness and
lethality (Esper, 2018). Another disappointing trend, specifically in terms of self-development in
the military, is that research is simply very limited (Annis, 2016; Chung, 2011; McGovern, 2009;
Wenzel, 2015). At least ‘limited’ to research like this, because longitudinal studies that do exist
are mostly behind military-enabled firewalls, or in proprietary and funded research databases
(contracts paid for by the Army, no less). Cho’s (2002) work on the interconnectedness of selfdirected learning and learning organizations further supports the concern that the Army’s
situation is less than stellar.
The good news for the Army is that other professions and industries have regularly
applied survey techniques to test self-development. One prominent and established version is the
Self-Directed Learning Readiness Scale (for more information, visit: http://www.lpasdlrs.com/).
2.1 Academic
Even better news for the Army is that academic literature is stuffed with adult learning
research; it is, after all, why academia exists. There is an entire international society “dedicated
to the promotion of self-directed lifelong learning and to the encouragement and dissemination
of continued research on self-directed learning both within and outside of institutional contexts”
(https://www.sdlglobal.com/). A good primer for those new to leading is from The Leadership

Quarterly, “Advances in leader and leadership development: A review of 25 years of research
and theory” (Day, Fleenor, Atwater, Sturm, & McKee, 2014). This paper introduces all of the
basic concepts, such as transactional and transformational leaders, intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation, traits, development, attributes, et al. An up-front self-development definition from
Knowles (1975) is good to keep in mind reading forward:
A process in which individuals takes the initiative, with or without the help of
others, in diagnosing their learning needs, formulating learning goals, identifying
human and material resources for learning, choosing and implementing appropriate
learning strategies, and evaluating learning outcomes. (p. 18)
One 752-page tomb is a fantastic source, but hardly something influential and busy Army
leaders will cozy up with in their free time, “Self-determination Theory: Basic psychological
needs in motivation, development, and wellness” (R. M. Ryan & Deci, 2017). Researchers
working for the Army might, but these works rarely see the light of day, and their impact is
questionable (if not a mystery). This author recommends “Learning in Adulthood” by Sharan
Merriam and Rosemary Caffarella (1999) for those interested in similar research. At roughly half
the page count to Self-determination Theory, it is comprehensive, easier to read, and has a
lengthy reference list (a new 2020 4th edition exists, Merriam & Baumgartner, 2020).
As mentioned, adult or self-directed learning has a host of names, but at the core, they
have three goals. This review is concerned most about one: Enhancing the ability of leaders to be
self-directed in their learning (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999). Beginning with Knowles’ (1975)
theory of andragogy and Tough’s (1979) self-directed learning approach, adults foster the means
to take ownership of their own learning. Brocket and Hiemstra’s (1991) expands on this with
their Personal Responsibility Orientation (PRO) model. The idea here is that humans are
“basically good” and have some “unlimited” amount of potential that needs improving. Learners
then become active participants in their development, as if it was meant to be. Many, if not all, of

these works make assumptions of the learner upfront. Nevertheless, assumptions are a slippery
slope in any army because they value facts and certainty.
McClusky’s theory of margin helps inform this paper because it factors a person’s life
situation as well as their personal characteristics; more importantly, it introduces the motivation
to learn and over time (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999, pp. 132–134). Simply put, some periods in
life may better lend themselves to investing in learning, but why devote any time at all? Here is
where motivation and learning come together. If people do not have some hard-wired drive to
learn for the sake of learning, why do they? Self-determination theory helps explain this by
expanding the idea of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to learn (Deci, Olafsen, & Ryan, 2017).
Intrinsic nods to Knowles and others work; that there exists some basic need to improve, while
extrinsic reasons acknowledge the world actually live in. It is very likely that both exist
simultaneously but along some continuum of self-desire and external-reward.
Other research provides a more holistic approach to self-development. These consider
one’s environment, the organization’s values, and basic physiological needs (Sackett et al.,
2016). The physical climate can also impact self-development (Knowles, 1975); while some
participants took some advantage to learn in the war, most did not. Some research touches on
technology and what that might mean in the future (Crowley et al., 2013; Livingstone, 2006).
This will likely include artificial intelligence and some personalized learning agenda (Gagné,
2013, pp. 321–326). This makes sense since self-directed learning has a positive effect on the
ability to learn, adapt and create (Beswick, Chuprina, Canipe, & Cox, 2002)—also a deep
craving by senior Army leadership. Research suggests that the quantity and quality of selfdevelopment should be considered (Boyce et al., 2010, p. 175). Finally, many authors hint at or

directly admit what Spear’s (1984) self-directed learning model concedes: that learning is largely
nonlinear and full of starts and stops.
Since this research is on officer-leaders, understanding two accepted leadership types is
important. The theory of transformational leaders was introduced by Bernard Bass in 1985, and
these are the type leaders that most want to be—at least in the Army (Sabga, 2017). They
influence others via motivation, exude integrity, and demonstrate true authenticity; they are
bound by high values and are ever the optimist. They build consensus by valuing the input of the
led, and they are apt to develop the same. It is no wonder there is research that supports a
positive relationship between transformational leaders and adult learners (Sabga, 2017, pp. 86–
87).
The other type of leader is transactional but should not be viewed as a bad leader or as
any less likely to learn. These leaders enforce existing standards and adhere to set organizational
goals. They motivate others extrinsically, focusing on rewards and or punishment. There is a
time and place for both types of leaders, while Army officers will undoubtedly wield both as the
situation dictates.
One final and widely accepted approach to learning is transformational. This loosely
matches the ALDM’s domains in that it consists of three main concepts: experience, critical
reflection, and development. This last concept accepts many of the considerations mentioned
with andragogy and self-directed learning earlier. Taken together, this “theory is about change –
dramatic, fundamental change in the way we see ourselves and the world in which we live in”
(Merriam & Caffarella, 1999, p. 318).
Most of the papers reviewed gave value to the importance of a consciousness or selfawareness in promoting self-development. One way to achieve this is via an assessment from

many vantage points. This is commonly known as a 360-degree evaluation or feedback system,
where the learner self-evaluates and receives inputs from subordinates, peers, and bosses
(McCarthy & Garavan, 1999, pp. 441–445). The U.S. military starting using a quasi-program as
far back as World War I, and by the 1950s, businesses had introduced it to advanced their own
leaders (Fleenor & Prince, 1997). Today, a 360-feedback tool in any profession is almost
ubiquitous.
The instrument comes in many formats and is normally tailored for a specific purpose.
Some organizations use this to, in part, rate the performance and productivity of workers. Others
still might weigh personality and interpersonal skills (Adenuga, 1991). Most attempt to gather
particular strengths and weaknesses in the employee, while the ultimate goal is to form some
plan to sustain the strengths and improve on weaknesses. Once a learner is armed with this
insight, the motivation to improve can be intrinsic or extrinsic (Reiss, 2009). In this author’s
experience, the power of the evaluation was a dedicated plan, and here is where an “agent” can
help. At a minimum, they can continuously monitor the plan and make real-time suggestions to
improve. Once the improvement facts and strategy are known, it is harder to ignore, but some do.
Salient to this paper is one 2010 study that was done in concert with the Army Research
Institute (ARI), “Propensity for self-development of leadership attributes: Understanding,
predicting, and supporting performance of leader self-development” (Boyce et al., 2010). This
research used 400 Army officers in the rank of captain during officer education in the
institutional domain. In 2010, these officers would have joined the Army after 2001, and likely
had about six to eight years of service.
Unlike most of the academic papers reviewed, this study took an empirical approach that
examined the personal characteristics of learners as well as the organization’s support (the Army

in this research) (Boyce et al., 2010, p. 160). Figure 5 depicts five factors and 15 variables that
contribute to self-development (left to right). The findings predict that individuals with ‘high
work and mastery orientation were more motivated to perform self-development; while those
with greater career-growth and mastery orientation, were more skilled.’ Career-growth
orientation positively impacted both skills and the motivation to learn. There was low to no
impact in achievement orientation and one’s cognitive ability, so no one has a reason not to try to
self-develop.

Figure 5. Leader Development Personal Characteristics
When the role of the organization was analyzed, the study had a surprising result. In this
case, the Army positively influenced leaders who had low or moderate levels of propensity to
learn. Those with an already high propensity did not benefit but “actually reduced performance
of self-development activities” (Boyce et al., 2010, p. 174). The paper proposes several plausible
reasons for this result, but one they did not, is that the Army tends to cater to the median

population (sometimes called the “lowest common denominator” by soldiers). Figure 6 also
demonstrates individual and organizational propensity to learn. This highlights the limits of what
organizations can do, and puts greater emphasis on the ‘self’ in self-development.
This finding should be a significant marker for the Army as they consider gaps in the
self-development domain. Improvements will require policy changes, which normally coincide
with resources, and this literally means money. The organization will undoubtedly want to
measure the cost and benefit, so Boyce et al.’s (2010) research should amplify that more
resources will not evenly lead to more development. In fact, some point of diminishing returns is
apt to happen.

Figure 6. Propensity for Self-development With and Without Organizational Support
Although rigorous, the paper does not develop what might be the most interesting
finding. Because they were only concerned about those who performed self-development, they
omitted the data from individuals with less than a 1.5 propensity measure (see red line on lowerleft of figure 6). Based on their method and survey size(s), this would mean that between 8 and

26 percent of respondents simply did not take part in self-development.3 This is a big range, but
even 8% of officers with six to eight years of service would be a sad finding and significant to
senior Army leaders. The next section highlights what the Army’s own research has discovered.
2.2 U.S. Army Literature and Some Practice
The Secretary of the Army may detail members of the Army as students… to enable
them to acquire knowledge or experience in the specialties in which it is considered
necessary that they perfect themselves.
At the broadest level, Army literature on self-development begins in the Constitution, and
more specifically in the U.S. Code, Title X, Subtitle B, as stated above (1956).4 This
methodically cascades down from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Staff via
various directives, instructions, and policies. Interestingly, the DOD does not have one capstone
leadership instruction source; rather, it demands that each service develop their own. They all
have different covers and titles and are organized differently. However, at the core, each service
essentially says the same about leadership—this includes aspects of self-directed learning and
officer development. The main differences are mostly linked to their defense mission, leader
environment (land, sea, air—and now, space), and unique service culture.
The Army’s leadership references are organized from broad to detailed. These are
derived from a series of policies, strategies, programs, and a long history.5 A good first source on
leading is Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, “Army Leadership and the Profession.” It
establishes the “leadership requirement model,” which essentially is what the Army wants its
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The study confirms that they analyzed 130 respondents, but did not make it clear if that was from 177 or 141
eligible surveys. A 2013 and separate Army study revealed that 4% of officers perform no self-development.
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https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title10&edition=prelim

And not simply in U.S. history. Service schools and senior reading lists routinely offer ageless biographies on
leading—both good and bad.

leaders to “be, know and do” (see Appendix C) (DA, 2019, p. vii). The pie-shaped figure below
(Figure 8) is a condensed version. The next and more lengthy publication is Field Manual (FM)
6-22, “Leader Development.” Even more details can be found in a series of Army Techniques
and Procedures (ATP) manuals, which delves more into leader actions, historical vignettes, and
examples for new leaders to learn from and maybe emulate.

Figure 7. Army Leadership Requirements Model
These ADPs, FMs, and ATPs are proven guides; think of them as what Army leadership
is and ideas on improving specific attributes and competencies. Other Army references are more
prescriptive, and in essence, direct soldiers and agencies what to do. One relevant document to
this research is the Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-3, “Officer Professional
Development and Career Management” (DA, 2017c). The short, 53 pages “describes the full
spectrum of developmental opportunities an officer can expect throughout a career” (DA, 2017a,
p. i). The Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, “Army Training and Leader Development,” expand this
and is 254-pages (DA, 2014a). More documents include additional AR’s, teaching Program of
Instructions (POI), and leader task lists. Beyond Army-wide sources, local installations and

commanders will also have policy, orders, and nuanced guidance on leadership development.
Many will have a dedicated leadership development program (LDP)6 focused on the small unit
and individuals (see Appendix E for an example at the battalion level). These documents and
verbiage do not always nest perfectly since they are all developed, refined, and (re)published on
a continuous basis (about 2–3 years). Still, they keep a common enough thread to be largely
timeliness, minus some modern jargon. Revolutionary War General and President George
Washington would understand the crux of the content.
Complementing and adding to all of these sources are web-based developmental guides,
courses, case studies, videos, and etcetera (see Appendix F). Games and other artificial
intelligence simulators are also gaining wide acceptance. One, in particular, attempts to capture
an officer’s development in one online place—Army Career Tracker (ACT). This web-portal
consolidates training certificates, operational experience, and leading tasks from a series of other
Army records. The picture it creates is as good as the technology needed to share the data and the
officer’s investment to review and interact with it. The portal offers many dedicated selfdevelopment resources based on the officer’s time in service, job, education, and pure curiosity.
Another sought after developmental tool from the Army are “broadening assignments.”7
These can be a few weeks or several years. However, in essence, they physically take the leader
away from their day-to-day experience and expertise. Examples include time with industry,
academic immersion, or visiting other countries’ military (with an accompanying culture
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More specifically, they will break this down in to officer and NCO professional development programs (OPDs or
NCOPDs).
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Broadening Opportunity Program: See:
https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Broadening%20Opportunity%20Programs%20Building%20a%20cohort%20of%
20leaders%20that%20allow%20the%20Army%20to%20succeed%20at%20all%20levels%20in%20all%20environm
ents

immersion aspect). The problem with these is that it is tied to ever-fluctuating resources (they are
expensive) and takes away from traditional “boots on the ground” development. The added value
to the Army is also unknown, while senior leaders have different views of what broadening
really means. The junior leader is caught in the middle because some Army leaders think it is a
waste of time, and others superb. The result could jeopardize promotions or future assignments,
so some officers might even eschew them.
In short, Army officers do not lack resources and opportunities to lead and better
themselves or others around them. It might seem overwhelming, but the development,
distribution, and integration into induvial Army leaders is a choreographed affair. Below is a
simple demonstrative figure, but understand that many thousands of soldiers and civilians, in
hundreds of organizations, exist to get Army leadership development ‘right.’ Self-development is
only one facet, and admittedly, it competes with other efforts (yellow highlight).

Figure 8. Army Leader Development Execution Model

Fostering leaders in the Army is meant “to develop a cognitive advantage through
increased breadth and rigor of learning in the art and science of war, critical and creative
thinking, and situational understanding” (DA, 2017a, p. 19). This is core to the “Army’s
Leadership Development Strategy” (ALDS) (Chandler III, Odierno, & McHugh, 2013), which
was recently enhanced by the October 2019 issued, “Army People Strategy.” The ALDM’s
(Chapter 1, Figure 1) three-domains remains the most comprehensive view of this process; while
the newer strategy wants to “increase the rigor” of learning but is short on details (Grinston et al.,
2019b, p. 7). Specific to the self-development domain, the Army recognizes three types:
structured, guided, and personal (DA, n.d., p. 3) (the types are also called formal, semiformal,
and informal in various publications). It lists them in this order, consistent with the author’s
experience in their value to the Army. The Army defines the focused research as:
Learning is a lifelong process. Institutional training and operational assignments
alone do not ensure that Army officers attain and sustain the degree of competency
needed to perform their varied missions. The profession of arms requires
comprehensive self-study and training. Leaders must commit to a lifetime of
professional and personal growth to stay at the cutting edge of their profession.
They must keep pace with changing operational requirements, new technologies,
common weapons platforms, and evolving doctrines. Every officer is responsible
for his or her own self-development. (DA, 2019, p. 6)
As in academic literature, the Army begins with some assessment of weaknesses or
shortcomings in the individual. These can be formal and administered by the Army and include
physical fitness, technical knowledge, and even reading compression and writing ability. A more
dedicated approach is the multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) program, an online
360-degree-assessment that includes observations and input from subordinates, peers, and
superiors (to include the leader’s opinion and is found on the ACT portal). The areas of analysis
are as diverse or pointed as the individual wants and are anonymous (DA, 2019, p. 6). The

program was mandatory since its inception in the early 1990s, but has become voluntary as
recently at 2019 as mentioned earlier.
Armed with an external and self-assessment, the leader develops a plan. Good plans are
reviewed by a superior officer (and or mentor) and have some time horizon with achievement
benchmarks (or goals) and reassessments included. Bad plans are simply those that go unmade or
not reviewed and or followed. Actions in the plan include professional reading, practice, writing,
research, and even observation. Emulating those you respect is a worthy goal, while avoiding
actions by perceived “bad” officers can be just as helpful.
In the author’s experience, and particularly in junior grades, superiors assigned reading
and required quarterly book-reports. The officers in the organization often met to dissect famous
battles, while each officer assumed the role of an influential leader and acted out the part they
played in the battle (explaining why this or that was done, and why). This was admittedly semistructured, but it required research on the person and the battle—it even forced many to find the
installation library. How could one show up to play their part unprepared? Over time, military
books like first-person accounts (“Heights of Courage”) were joined by deeper reading and
strategy on the bookshelf (“Supplying War”). Other development tasks and goals facilitated
hobbies, family-affairs, finances, public speaking, and personal conduct.
The Army clearly imagines these things are done on an officer’s own time, or what they
would consider after, or off-duty hours [The humor here is that senior leaders will regularly
remind officers that they are always on-duty, 24-7-365]. Admittedly, some of the officer’s goals
(improved weaknesses) can be partially, if not wholly achieved, in the other two domains of the
ALDM. Recall that the ‘personal’ type of self-development is listed third in documents, while

the Army own regulations want it to be first—or most important.8 The same can be said for how
the ALDM is described and always in this order: institutional, organizational, and selfdevelopment. Although the Army states these have like importance, putting the ‘self’ last in
words might add some unconscious bias. The domains (circles) in Figure 2 in Chapter 1 might
better describe ALDM in practice.
From day one in the Army, an officer has at least 20 written publications and more than
30 web-based sources to improve themselves. They have many echelons of superior officers to
help (Figure 16 in Chapter 4). Unfortunately, Army officers tend not to read their own doctrine
as much as the Army would like (Pomper, 2004). The Army compensates for this by directing
senior leaders to foster and guide junior ones, much like Brockett and Hiemstra’s (1991)
Personal Responsibility Orientation model’s “educational agent” (p. 24). The Army’s
“Leadership Development” manual puts it succinctly, “leaders must prepare themselves and act
to promote long-term stewardship of the [profession]” (DA, 2015, p. 8), and “are responsible for
ensuring their organizations develop subordinates” (pp. 1–2).
“Develops others” is one of the core leader competencies in the ADLM (see Figure 9
below and Appendix L). These, and associated publications, put the responsibility of subordinate
self-development on superiors (normally senior in age and rank, but at least experience). The
Army’s approach then is mostly an extrinsic affair to the individual. This is good in that it helps
to navigate the vast array of materials available. However, it is flawed if senior leaders fail to
undertake this task, or worse, are unable to because of a lack of experience from their own

“Integrating the fundamentals of leader development into the organization creates a positive, learning climate and
builds a mindset among leaders that development is a priority” (DA, 2015, pp. 3–1).
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journey. The 2013 Chief of Staff of the Army Leader Development Task Force had this
recommendation (one of three) in their final report:
Developing others demands from the Army both an individual leader response, and
an institutional response. Over the course of this war, the priority to send officers
to teach and mentor in professional military education declined to meet operational
demands.9 This practice must be reversed. If the Army indeed values developing
others, then from an institutional perspective, the Army must do what it values and
see to it that the very best officers are assigned to teaching and mentoring in
professional military schools, and the pre-commissioning sources of West Point,
ROTC, and OCS.
Admittedly, and from the author’s own experience in the Army of the 1990s, self-development
was sort of a mystery for many years (but was lucky to have help along the way).

Figure 9. Develops Competency
The Army’s depiction is simple in that it bins these traits but admits in the literature that
each one complements the other. A direct relationship between self-development and the 31
others exist, while “leads by example” demonstrates this: If senior leaders are seen reading
professional magazines, juniors are more confident that they ‘practice what they preach.’ This, in
turn, leads to greater trust between the leader and led. This should inspire the led and ultimately
encourage greater self-discipline, organizational innovation, and a better overall ability to lead
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This means that it did not meet the standards for war-time operations.

others. This, and other examples, are what the Army calls “setting a climate conductive to
learning” (DA, 2015, p. 6-1), and is core to transformational leading from the last section.
Based on the leadership requirements and an officer’s duty,10 the core of Army selfdevelopment is, therefore, formal and semiformal types. Leadership development plans are an
example of set goals and, ultimately, a gauge of improvement. Formal programs deliver
knowledge at specific times and places, and normally on-duty; they provide context to materials,
explaining how it improves the unit or the leader (normally both) (DA, 2015, p. 6-9). All of these
things can be checked to ensure adherence to regulations. They also become one aspect of a
supervisor’s annual evaluation of junior leaders. The motivation is there to excel in life-long
development, as much as it is to excel in day-to-day requirements (this means it varies by
individual). Academic literature would say that an Army’s means to motivate self-development
is largely extrinsic. It is also clear that the Army is seeking some intrinsic motivation as well
(DA, 2019, pp. 1–6).
The Army approach to personal or informal development is to extoll the benefits of
traditional mentoring which, “Focuses primarily on the mentee, examining the career path
through goal setting, with the overall development of the individual as the focus. This mentoring
is a process where the mentor and mentee join by their own volition” (DA, 2015, pp. 3–18). It
clearly exists “to assist the lesser-experienced person” which is inexorably tied to the Army’s
rank structure (DA, 2019, p. 2). The Army also accepts and promotes peer mentoring and the
important role that subordinates with experience play in developing junior officers (many times

Duty in the Army is, “to do what is right to the best of their ability” (DA, p. 2-2). This is central to the research
question: Even if we assume officers are committed to duty, their ‘ability’ to deliver remains in question. If you have
never seen an ‘educational agent’ in action, could you emulate it?
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senior NCOs). Some local mentoring programs have a bit of formality by listing names, but the
best is likely those fostered over the years, ranks and miles.
Mentoring then is the Army’s means to encourage the true self in self-development.
Officer’s accept their shortcomings and take actions above and beyond formal ways to improve
themselves. Consider this a self-awareness of how they fit in the larger organization, and how if
they grow, so does the unit, or conversely if they are not up to the challenge. Couple this with
some self-discipline and a savvy mentor guiding the learning and the result can deliver on the
life-long and intrinsic quality the Army seeks (needs). Admittedly, officers entering service have
various levels of curiosity and intrinsic motivation to be better. This is where the special and
often frank discourse between a mentor and mentee adds immeasurably to leader development.
When officers receive awards or other accolades, they will undoubtedly thank their subordinates
who do the work, the boss because they are there, and their mentors along the way—sometimes
by name (family and spouses too).
Below is a model of what “right” might look like for an Army officer leader career
(Figure 10, developed by the author). The vertical gauge (right) is admittedly some guess on selfdevelopment, while a leader’s entry point into the military (left) is broad and with varying
degrees of individual motivation. Still, it is known that age and schooling (maturity in the model)
correlate to participation in adult education (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999, p. 55), so one should
expect with certainty that self-development has a positive slope over the years.
The shown plateau is not intended to end self-development; rather, it acknowledges
Grow’s (1991) most advanced and final stage of self-learning. Variables for soldiers also include
programed periods of professional training, academic and degree awarding opportunities
(BA/BA, MA/MS), as well as ever increasing positions of responsibility. These are represented

as the small and positive steps on the gauge. Add to the model the Army’s hope that mentoring
has some exponential impact on an individual’s proclivity to seek self-development. This paper
cannot parcel-out the types of learning, but it is likely a mix of goal, activity and learningoriented development are at play (Merriam & Caffarella, 1999. p. 64).

Figure 10. Metaphorical Representation of Self-development
2.3 Army Research and Self-Development
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Army has studied aspects of and the proclivity to
participate in self-development via the Center for Army Leadership’s “Annual Survey of Army
Leadership (CASAL): Army Education” studies. This longitudinal study began in 2010 and
stopped in 2017, although the Army continues to garner similar leadership research via other
surveys. The unfortunate truth is, these and some of the results below are simply not read by
most officers. Even senior officials will most likely get a short summary or 20-minute briefing. It
might even be why the Army consistently discovers the same results and posits similar
recommendations each decade or so.
The CASAL results suggest that Army officers overall value self-development, but this
has ebbed and flowed (Figure 11). The negative slope from 2010 to 2013 is telling and described
in the paper’s introduction. That this trend has slightly reversed might seem good. However, if

officers have less and less appreciation for what self-development actually is, their selfassessments could be wrong. The Army’s take on the problem was consistent throughout the
years, “A persistent challenge with self-development is available time. Since self-development is
primarily an activity at the discretion and initiative of the individual leader, it is easily set aside
or delayed when other demands compete for leaders’ time. It is not surprising that only about
half of leaders report having sufficient time for self-development in their current assignment,
while one-third indicate they do not have time” (Riley et al., 2016, p. 78) (more discussion of
time and Army officers is continued below).

Figure 11. ALDM Domain Effectiveness, 2010–2016
A comprehensive 2013 RAND study called for “major” changes to the overall ATLD
processes via a more structured approach (Crowley et al., 2013). Many of the recommendations
included better understanding what sort of leaders are needed in the future as well as improved
analytics and ways to measure current development efforts. Unsurprisingly, it calls for more
resources too. The research acknowledges the self-domain but is largely mute on how it fits in

the larger process, while the impact of mentoring is not addressed. This is, perhaps, because
measuring self-development is hard, but not impossible.
The 2013 CSA report, introduced in Chapter 1, had more concrete things to say
concerning self-development (Adamshick, 2013). One of three recommendations concluded that
the Army needed to “dramatically” improve the culture regarding leader involvement in
developing others (Adamshick, 2013, p. vi). The narrative below sums up the CASAL findings
over the years:
Only one-third of leaders rate the developmental counseling they receive from their
immediate superior as having a large or great impact on their development. Further,
nearly one-in-five indicate they never or almost never receive formal or informal
performance counseling. Leaders report that the primary reasons why counseling
does not occur as it is supposed to, or when it is supposed to, are because leaders
are not held accountable when it does not occur and that leaders do not have (or
take) the time to do it.
A 2016 ARI study on producing strategic thinking and skills for the Army echoes call for
self-development (Sackett et al., 2016). It also admits a lack of focus, and that the lacking
resource might simply be time as mentioned throughout (Sackett et al., 2016): Enhancing the
Strategic Capability of the Army: An Investigation of Strategic Thinking Tasks, Skills, and
Development
Self-development is another area that is key to developing strategic thinking ability.
Many participants discussed the importance of self-development in strategic
thinking development, which is in part due to a deficiency of strategic thinking
developmental opportunities elsewhere. In addition, the current Army culture
prioritizes other activities above strategic thinking development at this time, putting
more responsibility on Army leaders to develop strategic thinking [key skills and
attributes] on their own time. Therefore, to increase strategic thinking ability, more
self-development opportunities could be developed and disseminated across the
Army.
Other studies of military leaders indicate that more than half realize they do not (or
cannot) dedicate proper attention to self-development (Crowley et al., 2013). Voids like these are
not filled quickly since it takes decades of education, training, and nurturing to allow peak leader

self-development (Thomas, 2006). These seasoned leaders should cultivate the same climate in
junior and mid-grade soldiers, or as the Army says, “promote long-term stewardship of the
[profession]” (DA, 2015). While many in uniform might agree with this, research sadly supports
that the effect of self-development is very little (Chung, 2011). This portends action on behalf of
the Army, which is already underway. The Center for Army Leadership, at their War College in
Carlisle, PA, is drafting a paper called, “Educating for Thinking Strategically: Building Capacity
across the Force (2020–2040)” (Educating for thinking strategically: Building capacity across
the Force (2020-2040), n.d.) to focus Army efforts (based on research from the Army Research
Institute (Sackett et al., 2016)).
Army leaders will have their work cut out for them. The most recent RAND study on
Army time-management indicates that lieutenants and captains are working “an average of 12.5hour workdays,” which leaves for little else (Saum-Manning et al., 2019). The study found that
these officers spent three percent of their time in a quarter on self-development. Perhaps more
telling is that six percent of the population consider development “non-mission-essential.” The
impact on self-development is obvious, but the result of overburdened leaders is the exact
opposite of the goals in the ALDM. The study found that “soldiers may resort to lying,
misrepresenting the truth, or seemingly tasking themselves and their subordinates beyond the
limits of productivity and effectiveness” (Saum-Manning et al., 2019, p. xi).
There is an obvious wealth of academic literature on adult learning, so much so, it can be
a bit overwhelming. It seems every aspect of self-development has a theory, but these can be
narrowed down to a shorter, widely-accepted, and accessible list of research. The same cannot be
said of the Army. As mentioned, the Army does research itself. However, in relation to selfdevelopment, one can only expect new literature every other year, and access to raw data is

mysterious or time-consuming at best. The Army’s doctrinal references are numerous and there
is a clear evidence that its self-development domain has been informed by academics. If soldiers
take the time to read these, they will be exposed to proven methods.
The next chapter is the paper’s methodology. It reminds the reader of the research
question, introduces the population and how the data was requested and collected. The chapter
closes by explaining the many procedures used and how these were assembled to meet scientific
rigor.

CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLGY
This research aims to better understand how 19 years of war has impacted the Army’s
self-development domain. This required getting a sense of what happened well before the wars
and today. Since the Army extensively studies itself quantitatively, and mainly via survey’s, a
grounded theory approach would better capture the period’s phenomenon from another
vantage—literally hearing what Army leaders say and do concerning self-development. The
research’s impact identified what the Army is doing well; but more importantly, what it is doing
poorly or not at all. The initial goal of the work was to develop a new theory about war and its
influence on the Army’s self-development domain, but that was not to be.
3.1 Research Question
The pointed research question is: How have 19 years of war impacted the U.S. Army’s
leader self-development today? More broadly, the research can shed light on this influence on
Army leaders in the near future. There were supporting questions too: How did Army officerleaders describe their perception of self-development as a value to themselves; what were the
perceptions of Army officer-leaders concerning the long-term value of self-development for the
Army; and how did leaders foster self-development attributes in those around them (‘develop
others’ in Army speak)? In essence, and besides being told to do so, what made officers engage
in self-development and when? Appendix D has a complete list of the questions used during the
interviews.

3.2 Methodology
In the researcher’s experience, and in talking with many officers about the Global War on
Terror (mainly the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters, but there are others), a common theme comes
up: ‘There was no time for anything, but getting ready, fighting and resetting to begin again.’ It
is convenient to say and largely agreed with, but is it true? The daily-weekly-monthly tempo was
undoubtedly demanding and hyper-focused on war-related tasks, but no one is certain about the
impact of this on self-development. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the Army knew selfdevelopment application dipped throughout the early 2000s compared with previous years, but it
never revealed why in any detail. Researchers then guessed that time was likely the cause, but
this research wanted to discovers something new.
Grounded theory was chosen for this research to tease out more than a Likert scale could
deliver. It aimed to hear soldiers tell their experiences before, during, and after11 the war as it
related to self-development and learning. Unlike a snap-shot in time annual survey, grounded
theory allowed a picture to develop over a longer period (Creswell & Poth, 2016, pp. 82–84).
The research leaned on Strauss and Corbin’s systematic procedure to help form a broader theory
about the impact of war on self-development (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Specifically, this method
compared time periods and actions, leader’s unique language to describe their thoughts, and a
modicum of the researcher’s own personal experience.
The methodology did evolve over time and is described in sections 3.6 and 3.7. The
original design was very objective and process oriented. After several interviews and the
associated analysis, it became clear that the participants had significantly different army
experiences and exposure to the war. Without really knowing at the time, the data collected and
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The wars are not over in 2020, but the tempo and the number of soldier’s deployed is vastly less.

the results more closely related to Charmaz’s (2008) constructionist approach to grounded
theory, which is less focused on a theory outcome, and more on “responding to emergent
questions, new insights, and further information and simultaneously constructing the method of
analysis” (pp. 402–403). After reading a paper by Anthony Bryant, it was clear that the research
was not a purist’s ground theory, but important nonetheless (Bryant, 2002).
3.3 The Researcher
There was an aspect of ethnography in this study, since the researcher served as an Army
officer for 20 years and still works in and around the population—32 total years (Creswell &
Poth, 2016, pp. 75–82). Admittedly, this could have introduced a bias toward his own
experience, but procedures emerged to limit this to the maximum amount (described below). It
also positively supported the relationship between the participants and the researcher (Charmaz,
2008). There were advantages to having a former officer conduct the research since the Army
has a unique culture, vocabulary, and structure that could easily frustrate another. Non-military
researchers could certainly choose this method but need to be aware that valuable time might be
needed to learn Army lingo and its vast (sometimes boring) literature.
The researcher is a retired Armor officer (think of tanks), and spent half of his service
training for and conducting combat operations. This included deployments and other “muddy
boot” experiences. The other half was spent in the institutional domain of the Army, not only as
a student, but as an instructor. The researcher developed leaders in the Army’s Reserve Officers’
Training Corps (ROTC) for six years. First, at the University of Tampa in Florida, and later at
The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. This experience is rather unique in the
Army, but provided expert knowledge of leadership and learning development—even an

assistant professor of the year award. This, and a passion for improving himself, added to the
rigor of the analysis and the work.
3.4 Study Participants
To narrow the research, only Army officer leaders that began their service prior to 199412
were asked to participate. This particular year would afford leaders at least ten years of service
prior to their war experiences and during the war itself. This is also close to when most officers
are promoted to the rank of major, which is an Army established benchmark for “senior” status
(also known as, “field-grade” this roughly coincides with the tenth year of service, which became
a salient part of the analysis in the next chapter). By this time, many have also received advanced
degrees in varying disciplines as well. Participants were still in active service and in the ranks of
lieutenant colonel, colonel, and general.
There are roughly 75,000 officers from the active Army, Army Reserve, and National
Guard, but only active-duty officers were selected. Based on the researcher’s experience, the
study will assume that the impact to active duty officers is more acute than their reserve
counterparts. This was due largely to a higher tempo of deployments but does not rule out some
important influences in the reserves (active soldiers deployed on a roughly 1:1 ratio, versus
reserves that were 1:3-1:5). There are also Army civilian leaders that have similar selfdevelopment goals, but this study was only concerned with uniformed responses. Another
option, but not used, included interviewing retired officers, but only those that recently left the
ranks.

12

Three YG 1996 officers were interviewed, but they also had five and six years of enlisted service. The researchers
knew them well and greatly respected their experiences and insight.

The recorded demographics of this population were gender, time in service, rank, and
branch. An officer’s branch is their specialty in the service. These include “combat” soldiers, but
also logisticians, transportation, medical, signal, etcetera leaders. This was an important
consideration since every branch tends to have its own subculture that may impact selfdevelopment. Their commissioning source (ROTC, USMA, or OCS), or how they became an
officer was also collected. A summary table is below.
Table 1. Select Demographics
Rank

Source

General – 2

USMA – 4

Colonel – 12

ROTC – 12

LTC – 3

OCS – 1

Year
Group
1985 – 2
1990 – 4
1991 – 3
1992 – 2
1993 – 3
1994 – 1
1996 – 3

Gender

Male – 15
Female – 2

Branch
General – 2
Armor – 3
Ordnance – 2
Infantry – 2
Quarter Master – 2
Chemical – 2
Military Intelligence – 1
Foreign Area Officer – 1
Nuclear Operations – 1
Strategist – 1

3.5 Data Collection
Prior to collecting data, the researcher sought and was granted exempt status by the
University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (see Appendix B). Based on prior
coursework on interviewing and reflecting with his committee, the researcher developed a series
of questions and anticipated probing questions for the volunteer participants (see Appendix D).
One pilot interview was conducted, although prior interviews were very similar to the final and
refined questions in this research.
Figure 12 was a basic way of depicting the interview questioning strategy used, and is
adapted from Creswell and Poth’s (2016) recommended categories (sensitizing, theoretical,

practical, and guiding) (pp. 70–71). The “baseline” (1) are those questions that might capture the
participant’s general knowledge of the Army’s ALDM. After this, questions began to expose
their experiences before 2001 (2. Before), and then asked them to highlight what they practiced
today (“after” or 3). Several pointed questions about the “during” (4) period better exposed gaps
between before and after (or not in some cases). The researcher expected and received a healthy
amount of “reflection” (5) throughout the interviews. Therefore, few probing questions were
needed for most participants. These might be commonly referred to as “Army stories,” and they
added to the overall fabric of analysis.

Figure 12. Questioning Strategy
An email invitation was sent to officer’s the researcher knew personally. The short note
asked them to participate in the study, and an informed consent letter was included. It also asked
them if they knew others that might be willing to contribute. This, and back-and-forth emails
established a time and place to conduct the interview. Only three interviews were done in person
because the world was convulsing in the COVID-19 pandemic. The remainder were done by
phone, which impeded physical data observations. Every email sent received a response, and half
returned with others that might be willing to participate. Female participation was a challenge,
but this was likely due to their relative population size in senior positions (the total Army is
roughly 15-17% female, which is up from 9% in 1980). Even so, and in the researcher’s
experience, Army leadership and learning are gender neutral.

Creswell and Poth’s (2018) Chapter 7, “Data Collection,” guided the next steps. The
phone and in-person interviews were conducted the same. After receiving a verbal acceptance to
participate, a voice recorder was turned on, and the interviews averaged 24 minutes (total hours
were 6.83). The researcher kept notes on the leader’s tone and other comments to probe. On
three occasions, senior participants asked that the recorder to be turned off so they could be
brutally frank. Notes from these events were disparaging but valuable to the research. The audio
file was then loaded onto a computer and sent to a fee-based online transcription service
(rev.com). A file naming convention made the participants anonymous, and only first names or
“sir / ma’am” were used during the questioning. The recorded audio file was deleted on the
recorder, and the original MP4 file was saved on an encrypted hard drive along with the
transcribed content. The researcher also kept handwritten notes and memos, which remain
secure. Lastly, a “thank you” email was sent to each leader along with a working paper on selfdevelopment.
3.6 Procedures
The interview questions remained the same for all participants (see Appendix D). After
four interviews, the researcher started coding the transcripts using NVivo 12 software. The
fidelity of the transcript was at least 99% accurate, and only Army jargon and acronyms were
wrong, but decipherable. The first-order coding was very broad, and the only patterns that
surfaced were mostly complaints about time for self-development and negative comments about
the institution (Saldaña, 2015, pp. 115–159). This, and relistening to the interviews, refined how
the questions were asked, the order in some cases, and added detail to the probing inquires.
Interviewing and coding continued in a similar way until participant 15. A more detailed second
coding effort refined 86 codes and 31 clear categories came to light with the help of memos kept

throughout (and random post-it notes when thoughts came). Two additional interviews fit the
categories and themes nearly perfectly and helped convince the researcher that data saturation
had been met. More analysis further refined the number of categories down to eight.
During the interviews, the participant often asked questions or made wrong or dated
statements about Army doctrine. Notes were kept, and only after the recorder was turned off did
the researcher answer questions or provide more accurate information.
3.7 Data Analysis
The data were transcripts, voice recordings, research notes, and memos. Open coding
initially provided very little insight, but many codes (86). As more interviews and codes were
added, relations13 were formed, and categories began to emerge. With the help of NVivo
software, it was fairly easy to bin codes into bunches and refine these into broader themes. After
going back through each transcript, additional remarks that were overlooked found a place and
added to the legitimacy of a category (Saldaña, 2015, pp. 235–263). This selective coding added
immensely to the analysis, but it also highlighted a limitation of the software or the researcher’s
familiarity with it.
Draft themes were already forming at this step and were captured in memos, which were
used later. After attempting to manipulate the software to capture or “see” the codes and
categories connections, the researcher defaulted to a more comfortable approach using Word
tables. This additional step added yet another layer of accuracy in that it forced additional code
reviews and their assigned category. Approximately 10% were reshuffled, and a few were

The whole process reminded the author of his military studies, specifically those of Moa Tse-Tung’s 1930 work
that espoused numerous and importance of relations.
13

removed, but it also created an entirely new category when the more familiar Word version was
finished (Creswell & Poth, 2018, pp. 189–197). Figure 13 depicts how this came together.

Figure 13. Theme Creation
Throughout the analysis, the literature review guided the ‘bins’ and validated previous
research on adult learning. It also uncovered potential flaws in the Army’s current survey
approach, which is discussed in the conclusion. The questioning model in Figure 12 also allowed
some temporal analysis that clearly demonstrated leaders maturing and reflecting on past lapses
in self-development.

Negating the researcher’s own bias was always a front-of-mind concern. During each
interview, a conscious and successful effort was made not to judge the answers at the time, but
rather to capture what was said and ask only clarifying questions. The transcripts became a
phrase-by-phrase exercise of coding, in that it was what they said, and left the meaning behind.
Soon the categories seemed to fill naturally and without judgment. If there was ever a question of
not using some piece, the researcher created a “dunno” code—or a depository that was visited
and used later (only five remained out of 92).
3.8 Summary
Ground theory, albeit modified, allowed a scientific approach to capture the impact of
war and self-development, which are highlighted in the next two chapters. The methodology
outlined in this chapter demonstrates that the collective experiences of select senior leaders can
increase the understanding of the Army’s self-development state today and beyond. The coding
and recoding were time-consuming, but the constant churn of these made several clear findings.
It also highlighted some unanticipated but connected Army phenomena that were not associated
with the research question. Although the Army does longitudinal studies that compares leader
cohorts over their career, there is value in asking individual soldiers to reflect on their early
years, significant milestones and now.

CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS

You can tell who is doing the self-development and who is not just by what they
bring to the table on a daily basis… (Officer comment)
Army leaders like the bottom line up-front, or BLUF; and its officers can be blunt,
without much time needed to think. So, when asked, “Figuratively speaking, do you think the
Army’s putting its money where its mouth is insofar as self-development?” they did not
disappoint. Figure 14 is a record of their reactions, and it serves as the introduction to the results
of this research. Even when leaders tried to give credit to the organization, it was not always
done with zeal. The “no” soldiers were not only quick to answer, but they made it with an ardent
tone. This tone became a common denominator during questioning, which illustrates the passion
most of these leaders have.

Figure 14. Immediate Reactions to a Pointed Question

This chapter starts with some findings of officer populations over the past several
decades. This is important because self-development concerns people, but in the case of the
Army, it is a whole domain—a collective of improving not only yourself, but those around you,
and over time. This primer should be kept in mind over the next sections. These describe the
categories and themes derived from grounded theory (see Appendix J for a consolidated list of
additional samples). They are organized for scholarly consumption, but in reality, they are
dynamic. One theme impacts another, and depending on the officer time in service, some
influence more and others less. The results answer some finite questions but often create more
open-ended puzzles that need dedicated study. The analysis section answers the research
question, while the final section offers a theory-primer about war and self-development in
general.
4.1 Officer Populations
This research focused on the war period, and although not over, the tempo of
deployment, casualties, and cost is greatly reduced. Unlike the Army surveys during the height
of the war-period, looking back provided some useful insights. In-between interviewing and
coding, the researcher gathered other data that might help answer the research question and
develop a theory or more. Some were irrelevant, other bits not used intentionally, but officer
grade populations delivered clear evidence.
The Army’s end-strength, as dictated by Congress, historically grows and shrinks which
is nothing new. But if you consider this study’s focus, a 21.5% growth in 13 years is more than
interesting. What is also telling is the impact of the 1990s RIF mentioned in Chapter 1. This
reduced the officer corps from 89,599 in 1990 to the low in the author developed Figure 15, or

64,878—a 27.4% reduction in just 11 years. This roller-coaster occurred in what is a typical
careerist officers’ time in service (roughly 26 years).

Figure 15. Officer Population Decline and Growth, 1990-2016
More results come when the populations are broken out by grade, as seen in Figure 16.
The majority of the growth was in lieutenants and captains (33.5%), while the rest of the more
senior grades grew by only 18.2% on average. This makes sense in that you cannot simply inject
a major or colonel into the force.14 Leaders must be “grown” from induction and junior grades to
experienced and savvy leader-warriors.
To create growth in these advanced ranks is a deliberate Army decision to retain and
promote officers that would have otherwise been discharged for a relative lack of demonstrated
leadership. This is also known as “up or out.”15 Many that simply desire ‘out’ may be told to stay
via “involuntary continuation” or offered financial or education incentives to stay. Growing
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There is a process that allows direct commissioning in senior grades for special skills and mostly from the medical
and highly technical fields.
The flipside to ‘up or out’ during a RIF is that quality leaders that should be promoted, are told to get out. It is not
only demoralizing for those remaining, but is inefficient and financially costly.
15

young and junior officers’ uses some of these same strategies but include others. An army in
need often provides incentives to join, and from Chapter 2, it lowers the commissioning
standards to join. When the need is greatest, the Army may also relax age limits to serve and
look past criminal history to join.

Figure 16. Grade Population Growth, 1994–2016
Population growth in this period alone is significant, while one could argue the impact of
the methods used. When one more layer is revealed, regardless of growth or reduction,
lieutenants and captains in Figure 17 were 61% of the corps in 2013. These leaders are the most
junior, least experienced, and have served for the shortest time. In 2013, this officer cohort only
knew an army at war (see section 4.2.8 and Figure 21 to see what the corps’ population looked
like graphically). Unsurprisingly, they were the ones most in need of any and all development. In
2020, they have either left the force or attained the rank of major, while most are junior colonels.
They have become the cadre the Army expects will foster the next officer generation. The
sections below describe how they might have been short-changed by a very long war, and little
to no exposure to self-development.

Figure 17. Aggregate Officer Population
4.2 Themes
Chapter 3 highlighted the process of narrowing codes to eventual themes. The table of
distinguishable categories below is a summary based on experience and the methodology.
Categories like “It is a problem” and “It is a problem today” might sound as though they should
be grouped alike, but there are acceptable, albeit finite differences in the two. The same can be
said about “Mentoring” and “Lack of mentoring.” Consider these the same coin, but with
different sides and stories to tell and in-line with the “flip-flop technique” in the literature
(Corbin, & Strauss, 2008, pp. 76–77). The next eight sections describe these finding. Some are
directly related to the war, while others deliver a larger critique of the domain in question.

Categories
Leader confusion / frustration
Mentoring
Leader blames the army
Lack of mentoring
It is a problem
360
Importance of educational agents Counsel
It is a problem today
Anti-intellectual
Lack of educational agents
Competition
War
Spark
External distractions
Peers
No time to reflect
Duty
Priority
Expectation
Operational
Develop others
Institutional
Reflecting on past
Reading
Didn’t get it
Experience
Reward / Incentive
OPD / LPD
Curiosity
Care or Self-disciplined
Figure 18. Distinguishable Categories
4.2.1 Institutional Responsibility
Table 2. Categories Leading to an Army Problem
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Code Examples
With self-development… sometimes I'm not even sure what we're
talking about
There's a mismatch between the intent of self-development and the
desired outcome of self-development
There is a misconception among the force in terms of what leader
development as a whole means
Well, how is it being measured?
I have heard leader development and self-development for over a
decade… and I have not seen an emphasis put on it other than in
words
The Army says a lot of things are important and sometimes they
follow through and sometimes they don't [referring to SD]
Telling us to do self-development without providing the resources
such as time or opportunities is somewhat hypocritical
A challenge for us institutionally is self-development
I think that we do a pretty much of a hand wave over selfdevelopment
The first thing that goes overboard is self-development
There's a lot we could do to improve

Categories

Leader
confusion /
frustration

Leader blames
the Army

It is a problem

Officers clearly put the onus of self-development on the Army’s shoulders, whether
giving it a positive or negative grade (Table 3). The vast majority of comments graded it poorly
and acknowledged that a lack of self-development was indeed “a problem” for the institution and
individuals. Leaders were frustrated, and some of this can be found in the Army’s own literature.
As mentioned in Chapter 2 the Army says, “Every officer is responsible for his or her own selfdevelopment” (DA, 2019, p. 6); but in others, it ascribed the importance of “Developing Others.”
This should not be a huge leap, but it was.
More than frustrated, the officers interviewed had an overall poor understanding of the
Army’s expectations, even if they were fully engaged in life-long learning and mentoring
juniors. Their confusion stems from missing this important Army principle, “Leader
development is cooperative and holistic. The individual officer, unit commanders, mentors, and
Army educational institutions all share in the responsibility for developing leaders at every level”
(DA, 2019, p. 6). Studies reveal that the Army asks leaders to self-report their understanding of
self-development, and this has recently been on a positive trend. What if, as mentioned in the
introduction and now described here, officer’s appreciation level and understanding is small?
The result is an army that does not know itself, and a lesson learned at least 2,500 years ago by
Sun Tzu (emphasis added).
He who knows the enemy and himself,
Will never in a hundred battles be at risk;
He who does not know the enemy, but knows himself
Will sometimes win and sometimes lose;
He who knows neither the enemy nor himself
Will be at risk in every battle (Ames, 2010, p. 113)
When pushed to defend their own self-development, many complained of no time (more
on this in section 4.2.3), a lack of priority (section 4.2.4), and surprisingly, a lack of resources. In
reality, the Army has an exhausting cache of resources (see Appendix F). This officer’s

assessment surmises this theme, “If the Army doesn't make it easy to do the right thing, we're not
going to do it.” This harkens back to what seems to be a now old Army quip, ‘do the hard-right
over the easy-wrong.’ Still, this officer’s candor might ring true today. Perhaps the Army has the
wrong resources? Or maybe they are inaccessible and simply too many to digest?
4.2.2 Educational Agents
Mentors, peers, educators, bosses, and family were all examples of self-development
support provided by officers. This should not be a surprise and validates Brockett and Hiemstra’s
(1991) Personal Responsibility Orientation, which describes the importance of “an educational
agent” (p. 24). For all of the accolades to agents, “There's no doubt in my mind, I would not be
where I am today, if not for [my mentor]”, there were the same number that described a lack of
them, “I never really experienced a mentor. I read about it, heard about it, and never really felt
like I ever had [one].” Table 4 demonstrates that leaders are aware of the problem, which is both
good and bad.
Table 3. Lack of Educational Agents
•
•
•
•

Code Examples
Category
We don’t tell them what that self-development looks like, other than to
say work on your weaknesses
There is a good core of people who can do it… [and] there are people
who are not doing it at all... some of it is because they're unable
personally
Lack of
educational
If you don't point them in the right direction or give them a starting
point or set conditions for self-development to happen, it probably won't agents
Just by mathematics there's less people there to codify and develop the
profession's technical knowledge. As that gets eroded and by extension
you're going to see a degradation of what the standard is for professional
development
Growing the Army’s future leaders has always relied on formal and informal relations

with leaders around them. The group of officers interviewed challenged this notion in today’s
circumstances. Some bemoaned a generation gap, but when has the Army not had one. Again,

others pointed to a lack of time, but some hinted that they recognized some leaders that are
simply incapable, “There is a good core of people who can do it… [other] people who are not
doing it at all... some of it is because they're unable personally” (Officer comment). This was
probably true in the past, but is it more prevalent today?
4.2.3 Little Time
This researcher has likely said, “I don’t have time” many thousands of times in his
uniformed days (and still does). In relation to the war-period and self-development, every officer
mentioned the time premium when deploying was discussed. This comment summarizes the
impediments to adult learning during war, “I can do it in three words. Lack of time.” This
researcher can attest that war is particularly time-consuming. Still, there was learning going on,
but it was not the sort of life-long and emancipating type the Army wants and needs. The
academic literature in Chapter 2 supports this if you consider the physical climate and
environment of a battlefield. When pushed on any self-development during high tempo times,
this was a common answer, “There wasn’t any self-development going on, brother.” If colloquial
words were ignored, ‘time’ was the most common term in all interviews.
Some officers couched the idea of physical time by explaining other Army priorities and
external distractions, “I've got a working wife and 4 kids, so most of my time is taken up by
them.” This is fair, but others in the same situation over the decades were able to engage in
development. Defining priorities and individual leader motivations is discussed below. Recall
that leader development remained an Army priority during the war, at least by policy and
regulation. But when there truly is no time left, “The first thing that goes overboard is selfdevelopment” (Officer comment).

Out of curiosity, how much time does a soldier have today, and not in a war-setting? This
has evolved over time, and Figure 19 is by no means every leader. The BLUF is 103 days off,
210 working or on duty (10 hours / day, but many do more like the reported 12.5 hours in
Chapter 2), and around 122 sleeping (8 hours / night). What has changed is that soldiers are not
around one another as often as they were in the 1990s. If deployed, the opposite was true, but
meaningful conversations are hard to have when dodging incoming rockets. Eleven days of no
scheduled activity, or DONSA, is recent in the past 15 years and is basically a day off. While
some units do train on the weekends today, it is the exception rather than the rule—rare even.
With less time around others, are officers missing mentoring opportunities? Conversely, with
more time off, you would think there would be more time for self-development as the Army
envisions it. The on-line social media explosion is probably another factor impacting time and
priorities.

Figure 19. Soldier’s Time in Hours
4.2.4 Competing Domains
The ALDM has three domains, as described in Chapter 1. Figure 2 was introduced there
as a hunch, but now it is confirmed. Officers describe a crushing amount of exposure to the
operational domain—particularly during the highest war-tempo periods, “I get up early, come

home late and rely really on my operational experiences to provide the most of my development
as an officer” (Officer comment). There is no surprise here—just a fact for most, as seen in Table
5.

Figure 2 (Repeated). Author’s Perception of the ALDM

Table 4. Operational Domain Code Examples
•
•
•
•
•
•

Code Examples
Haven't had the time between family and operational assignments and
deployments
OPTEMPO when I was in operational units was so hard or fast that there
was really almost no opportunities for self-development
For guys that are running with the operational army to have a meaningful
outside of your work day, self-development effort
They certainly put their money where their mouth is operationally
You can't entrust [SD] to the senior rater or the rater cause all they're
focused on is maximizing the value of that officer for the good of the
operational assignment they're in den
We were so busy just focused on doing our mission

Category

Operational
Domain

Overall, the institutional domain was applauded for knowledge gained and was often a
catalyst for greater self-development (see section 4.2.7). This author recalls one history professor
that wrote three-times worth of corrections to the five-page assignment. On meeting to discuss
this, she pointedly said, ‘your grasp of English is horrific and you need to fix this in the next six

months!’ Although a work in progress, I heeded the critique and checked out some grammar
books from the library. Like the officers interviewed, this was one of many self-development
intercepts. Some officers describe the impact of this domain as fleeting, “The institutional
domain's like going to the gym every day. And then all of a sudden, once you leave the
institutional domain, you stop going to the gym” (Officer comment).
When the war-period and the institutional domain are singled out, the support for leader
development was clearly poor. Some described missed chances for school, but others were more
animated, “When it was their time to be developed, we sent them to Iraq and Afghanistan instead
of learning how to attack.” One very senior officer admitted, “Then of course cost, we reduced
the number of courses available, we changed instructor-student ratio. You go from small group,
collegiate level discussion and interaction to one over the world, large group instruction”
(Officer comment).
4.2.5 What’s Not Working
This theme is obviously tied closely to the next: What Works. In most cases, a lack of
what works is what is not working. For example, a lack of mentoring erodes self-development,
while having mentors greatly expands it. A lack of mentors surprised this researcher, who was
fortunate to have many over the years. By far, answers to questions about mentoring followed
this theme, “Oh, mentors. That's a sore subject for me. I did not have any mentors in my basic
branch” (Officer comment). The ‘basic branch’ referred to is lengthy to explain, but in short, he
had none for about the first ten years. The table below is a third of the disparaging comments on
mentoring in the Army.

Table 5. Lack of Mentoring
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Code Examples
You have other leaders who maybe were never mentored themselves or
never really fully grasped it… it just wasn't within their personality profile
to be a good mentor
I personally don't have anyone that I call a mentor
Mentor? No. None. That was pretty easy
There's no particular leader of mine, company commanders, field grades,
anything like that, that encouraged [me]
No, and it's been that way my entire career
I've got to admit, especially when I was a junior officer, I never really
experienced a "mentor." I read about it, heard about it, and never really felt
like I ever had a formal mentor per se
I just didn't experience it [mentoring] myself at an early age
Mentorships one of these things the army's always talked about [he then
went on to eviscerate it]

Category

Lack of
mentoring

The notion of a ‘10-year’ mark came up over and over, “I don't think I really got my act
together until I was about 10 years into the Army…” But for many, this was about the start of the
war or a few years earlier. Is this first decade wasted insofar as self-development? Or just
another and less advanced form similar to Grow’s (1991) self-directed learning levels? Half of
the officers admitted at one point or another in the interview, “I just didn’t get it,” but later when
on to tout self-development. Some offered that they lacked self-awareness when junior, but
others pointed back at the institution, “I don't think self-development was a thing back then as far
as something that [the Army] was pushing” which is factually incorrect. They probably just did
not get it, like many others.
The problems surrounding self-development very often took a back seat to systems and
procedures that do not technically belong in the domain. These include a lack of rewards and
incentives and an admonishment of regulatory counseling requirements and its associated 360degree feedback mechanism. The idea of some reward validates Deci and Ryan, as well as

Knowles and others’ work. The officers interviewed clearly preferred the extrinsic valuation
versus the larger intrinsic one, but both were acknowledged similarly.
The last prominent category in this theme is discouraging for a self-admitted learning
organization. Apparently, there was not only a lack of mentoring, counseling, and selfdevelopment promotion but an active effort to suppress academic curiosity. This researcher
experience was in line with those interviewed. Early in a career, value went to brawn and not
brains. Bragging about how well one did on their fitness exam was far ahead of what book you
read last night. This changed for me and some of the officers interviewed ‘around the 10-year
mark,’ unsurprisingly. But not all interviewed seemed to rally to academics; instead, they said
some peers could be too “bookish.” The author has been accused of the same on many occasions.
This anti-intellectualism is described well by Andy Rohrer (2014), who makes a good case that
“…blame for this condition rest[s] on the bureaucracy of the institution.”
4.2.6 What Works
Clearly, the other two domains support self-development, which is the design of the
ALDM. So, when asked to specifically support their self-development actions, reading and
mentoring were vastly described. Not surprisingly, these are also some of the more timeconsuming methods. There were other things, as well: working out, independent course work,
and structured development programs were common (see Appendix E for an example of a
structured program). Overall, there was not one single thing this research could tease out. What
is working is holistic and exactly what the Army wants.
Reading gets special attention because those interviewed had a common and expected
theme. Early in a leader’s career, reading topics were focused on the profession. Books,
magazines, and journals about conflict were on top, as well as the Army’s volumes of doctrine

and regulations. Every senior leader seems to have a recommended reading list to aid leaders.16
Then, ‘around ten years in’ the subjects changed. This researcher recalls arriving at a yearlong
course on war and strategy, only to be given the book, “Money Ball” by Michael Lewis. It was
meant as an introduction to analytics, and something the Army was advancing in the early 2000s.
Those interviewed imparted the same, in that they not only enjoyed non-military reading more,
but also gained different ideas and spent more time reflecting on the alien issues. Said one
officer, “Books on learning theory or philosophy… [gave] me greater depth rather than just
technical knowledge.”
As mentioned in the last section, mentoring in the Army needs some attention, but for
those that had mentors (author included), their impact was significant. Not only were mentors a
usual ‘spark’ in officer’s, but they continued to add fuel to the fire over many years. This is an
Army expectation explained by the ‘develop others’ characteristic of leading. The Army should
obviously expand on what seems to be an ace-card up its sleeve. But what if it is a two-of-clubs
today?
4.2.7 Individual Motivations
This theme was very prominent across all demographics, but it is impossible for the
research to dissect each category in detail (Figure 20). If there is a kaleidoscope of why Army
officers partake in self-development, this is it. Although fascinating, it does not help answer the
research question but might instead provide future insight on reversing the impact of the war.
The notion of some ‘spark’ has already been introduced and explained.
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The current U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List is 60 pages long!
https://history.army.mil/html/books/105/105-1-1/CMH_Pub_105-5-1_2017.pdf

Figure 20. Individual Motivations to Engage in Self-Development
In particular, one motivation deserves a bit more attention because it has been studied and
in Army officers. Made more familiar to those outside the profession, General MacArthur’s
1962, “Duty, Honor, Country” speech conjures the essence of service to the Nation.17 The
influence of ‘duty’ obliges leaders to do, and is related to another category of some expectation
because they wear a uniform. Even when an officer is terrified and their existence (and that of
their troops) is on the line, a sense of duty (among others) makes them act. Not only do they do
the right thing, but they may physically and emotionally demonstrate the same to others (Dixon,
Weeks, Boland Jr, & Perelli, 2017, pp. 309–310). Again, something the Army wholly expects of
senior leaders but fostering duty is mysterious and complex (particularly if joining the Army is
seen as a job).
4.2.8 Developing Others and 360 Assessments Lacked Much Mention
One theme became so because there was so little mention of it. When asked to explain
the domain, one would expect someone to explain how they encouraged self-development in
others. It is easy to say, ‘I do this or do that’ as examples, but that is not what people said. It was

It also includes the truest and famous statement, “the soldier, above all other people, prays for peace, for he must
suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war.”
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurthayeraward.html
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only after the researcher asked pointed questions about developing others did he get some
expected techniques, but the feedback was overall thin on details.
One valuable technique is to urge leaders to perform some 360-assessments to identify
shortcomings that need developing. The value of this is not lost on the Army or other professions
(McCarthy & Garavan, 1999, pp. 444–445). This is also something Army leaders can check. A
leader can say ‘take the MSAF’ to a subordinate, and see if it happened. Discouragingly, this was
what he heard, “If you had done 360 20 years ago… it would've been phenomenal;” “I certainly
would have benefited from that kind of 360 assessment;” and “there was no feedback loop [to
identify weaknesses].” It might have been good that these interviews were conducted on the
telephone because the researcher could not have hidden his surprise. The online MSAF and a
more manual version have been part of the ALDM since at least 1987.
The importance of developing others has already been addressed and is essential to the
domain in question. Why was it so fleeting in the minds of many officers? Perhaps the time it
takes, as mentioned, or another reason? Do they consider this part of their regulatory
responsibility to counsel and not tied to self-development?
One reason could be the number of officers that require senior support – the educational
agent or mentor. Theoretically, and based on some populations in Figure 21, a senior leader’s
burden is not so great. But this figure is more descriptive of the population. In practice, and
based on the researcher experience, a senior leader can expect to be responsible for 5-10
subordinate officers, and these doubles if you consider the NCO corps. You may have even more
unofficial ties to past mentees as well. The reason for this is that many senior officers are not in
charge of anyone; they sit on staffs doing technical analysis and planning, but even these officers
will be in contact with junior ones that can benefit from an informal relationship.

Figure 21. Average Population by Grade Contrasting Year 2013
4.3 Analysis
The research question remains: How have 19 years of war impacted the U.S. Army’s
leader self-development today? The answer lies not so much in the past 19 years, but in the 10–
13 prior to that. The results of this grounded theory study demonstrate that senior officers today
have a poor understanding and appreciation of what the Army expects of them. They entered the
war-period at what appears to be a crucial point—‘around the 10-year mark.’ As such, some got
the ‘spark,’ while others did not, and research shows that each individual entered service with
varying degrees of adult-learning savvy.

As then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “You go to war with the army you
have,” and that is where it largely stayed in relation to the self-development domain. Historical
impediments to self-development were amplified many-fold by the war. The available time alone
justifies this, while the priority was rightfully put on winning. Officers joining after 2000 were
caught in this and further impacted by a cohort that may or may not have ‘gotten it’ insofar as
adult-learning.
This long war has eviscerated one-third of the ALDM. Time had another influence, in
that over the past 19 years; very senior leaders that did their professional maturing in the 1970s
to 1980s have left the force. When policy decisions to keep some officers involuntarily in service
were lifted, those that had the most potential departed. The Army’s longitudinal research on
leadership most likely had a blind spot in the self-development domain. While the other two
domains are very clear, adult learning is less explicit. So, to ask a leader to gauge something they
do not appreciate would gather questionable results. As these results show, officers today can
only now see how poorly they understood. When asked to gauge their self-development, officers
likely gave themselves far too much credit.
The analysis creates a larger question that draws on established research. There is a
positive correlation between adult learning and creativity (Torrance and Mourad, 1978). The
Army is striving for leaders that are not only comfortable with uncertainly but thrive in it. They
want agile, adaptive, and resilient officers with strong character and innate professional judgment
(DA, 2014b, p. 10). Can the Army achieve these things without first correcting its selfdevelopment domain? The author thinks the domain will self-correct over time, but will it be in
time when needed next?

The answer to the research question can be seen in another way as well. If the Army
knows there is a deficit in self-development, the problem is much more likely in the ‘develop
others’ characteristic in the ALDM. Recall Brocket and Hiemstra’s PRO model. Junior leaders
today are as curious as ever. One officer summarizes what many hinted at, “We've got a lot of
young officers out there who are really, really hungry for information.” And given the PRO
model, that is half of what is needed. The other is bosses, mentors, or educational agents to
energize the learning.
The impact today may sound discouraging, but many officers remain dedicated to the
domain. The concluding chapter will offer some areas for additional study and some ways to
potentially kick-start or ‘spark’ others.
4.4 Summary
The analysis did not create a theory, but it painted a picture any army should be aware of.
Sometimes history is all leaders have to guide them, and there is a long history of war, which is
costly for any nation and in countless ways. For the U.S. Army, this recent conflict impacted
their leaders in real time, and today still. The Army has relied on self-development to fill gaps in
leadership that structured learning and operations failed to. It also gives credibility to the
profession as a learning organization. The war in the early 21st century and this research paints
an uncertain future given the pace of the world today.
Figure 22 demonstrates what might be happening to self-development in the Army. Here
are six unique officer careers over time and surrounding the war period (the green-wedge shape
is one career, or even a cohort introduced in Chapter 2, Figure 10). The red to the left of the
figure reflects a well-documented Army revival after the Vietnam War. The two left-most
careers represent a time when there was no kinetic war, while the third one with the “wars” bar

shows the last 19 years. The next two have a negative slope because the analysis suggests that
the wars impact on self-development will have a lengthy and negative impact on the Army (the
far-right career assumes this will reverse). At war, and without a vibrant self-development
domain, an army’s intellectual capacity is hobbled. Individual officer’s sense of duty will erode,
and they will prefer the status-quo; initiative will wan, while an anti-intellectual culture will
pervade. Unchecked, a good-enough mentality that sees service as a job for money will shorten
careers and experience. The final chapter provides some ideas to redraw this figure.

Figure 22. Self-Development and the Future

CHAPTER FIVE:
CONCLUSION

The illiterate of the 21st century will not be those who cannot read and write, but
those who cannot learn, unlearn, and relearn. (Toffler, 2006)
Unlearning and relearning sounds easy. It is not, but that is what the Army must do and
sooner insofar as self-development. This paper started with Peter Senge’s (2010) idea about
‘learning organizations,’ so it ends with one of his more common citations and a popular rule,
“Today’s problems come from yesterday’s “solutions”” (p. 57). In a sense, this is where the
Army finds itself today, but it needs to keep his last rule in mind because it is often forgotten,
“There is no blame” (Senge, 2010, p. 67).
The introduction also suggested, ‘The Army may have several cohorts of leaders that are
less capable of fostering self-development.’ The research herein concludes this is true, but to
what extent is still unknown and ripe for more study (see section 5.2). Overall, the Army has
some organizational dissonance when it comes to leader self-development. In one voice, they
clearly put the onus of developing others on leaders at every level. Therefore, the led are subject
to extrinsic motivations like mentors, superiors, and some larger competition for promotion and
recognition. In another, they explain that developing is an individual responsibility born from
some intrinsic motivation to improve the self, while the collective—the Army—enjoys the
benefits from it. It is satisfactory to have it both ways, but the Army should be certain it knows
this. More importantly, it needs to educate its officers, which is the next section.

5.1 Improving the Domain
The self-development domain in the Army is fragmented and not beyond repair. The
officers interviewed had their own ideas (Appendix K), but nearly all admitted it is a big,
complex, and important problem to address. There is not one thing that will enhance the selfdevelopment domain’s condition, but several quick-wins might shorten the impact from the war
discussed in Chapter 4.
Ending the wars would be an obvious great start and win number one, but this is beyond
the Army’s control. The remainder of the wins are in no particular order.
Win 2: The Army could learn from its sister-services. The Navy, used to long to seadeployments that add up over the years, is already addressing what it found in 2018: “widespread
shortfall in basic seamanship” (Larter, 2018). Given the costly ship accidents over the past
several years, there is very likely something going on. The Navy is addressing this by vastly
expanding access and resources to its officer to attended advanced degree programs (Kenney,
2020).
Win 3: This researcher has always championed an increased military-academia
relationship. Yes, there is ROTC and some other efforts mentioned in Chapter 2, but it could be
so much better, and both professions would benefit greatly. The Army brings people and
resources, while the institutions bring knowledge—both bring new approaches to share. A
focused and institutionally driven approach can finally mix .mil and .edu more than it is today.
Since the Army wants innovated leaders, why not send them to the nation’s innovationplayground – its many, many campuses. The precedent for this already exists with business and
is called “Training With Industry.”

Win 4: Based on a constant flow of military professional journals, blogs, and articles, the
Army knows it has leadership and other problems to solve. This is a quasi-steady-state condition
for all armies. Some of these are aging equipment and technical shortfalls that are extraordinarily
expensive, but a new administration and the country's financial woes from COVID could present
an opportunity.
Assume then, that the Army’s budget will be significantly reduced. The time and energy
put into testing, development, and acquisition of hardware can be partially re-directed to less
physical and more mental stimulus. One officer interviewed hit this target squarely, “The selfdevelopment domain in the Army is inherently linked to the strength of the institutional Army
because that's where the core technical knowledge of the profession resides, and that's the
benchmark against which self-development occurs.” Fortunately for the Army, but less so for
many small institutions, there are a lot of unemployed higher-educators available since COVID.
The Army can afford this change since it takes industry a relatively short time to ramp-up
defense production in a crisis and far less than it takes to nurture senior leaders. The German
army found itself in a similar place after WWI; kept from keeping much equipment and forced to
keep its size small, the Wehrmacht literally went back to school. The results were militarily
historic.
Win 5: The most capable capacity to reverse war impacts lies today in its senior leaders.
As discussed, this cohort is degraded but far better suited than a lieutenant with three years in the
force. More priority should be placed on developing others; in other words, ‘what are you doing
to get your juniors to engage in self-development?’ When called on to the account, there is a
history of success as noted by this officer, “Without a forcing function, nothing in the Army gets

done.” In the case of self-development, it will come to an Army decision on priorities. These will
need to be guided by additional research, which is the next section.
Win 6: This win is tied to the priority win before, and it is as simple as making more time
for self-development. The two need to comingle because you cannot have one without the other,
while the analysis clearly defines time as derogatory to self-development. The allocated time
does not need to be forever, either. A resourced effort by the Army will re-instill not only the
importance of life-long learning but add tools for leaders to use now and as they gain rank.
Consider this muscle memory, but for the brain.
Several weeks before this research went to final submission, the Army published an
“Action Plan to Prioritize People and Teams” and admitted that, “People are our greatest
strength, our most valuable asset, and our most important weapon system.” It was very
reassuring to read, “We will strive to reduce [operational tempo], adjust policies to prioritize
People, and reduce requirements to provide leaders additional time to invest in their People”
(Grinston, McConville, & McCarthy, 2019a). It went on to say what else is needed: “investing
significant resources;” focusing on smaller units; reducing competing demands; adding metrics;
and adjusting policies via a “holistic review.” Perhaps someone will even read this dissertation?
5.2 Areas for Future Research
Separating the Army from its leaders and vice-versa might be possible, but future
research needs to consider both and simultaneously. They might technically be separate units of
measurements, but those seeking real impact should not ignore the sum of the whole. Chapter 4
had questions like, ‘Is the first decade of service wasted insofar as self-development’ and ‘Why
are officers slow to recall and demonstrate the developing others characteristic?’ There are others
too, but the three below might be the most interesting and have the most impact.

5.2.1 Measuring Self-development and Developing Others
This idea is not lost on anyone, including this officer: “If you don't have that anchor
point, then you don't have a metric upon which to move forward from to say this is what selfdevelopment should look like.” The Self-Directed Learning Readiness Scale is one of many
solutions, while the Army should consider expanding the work Boyce et al. (2010). Regardless,
the self-reporting technique will only measure so much. Once a measurement is achieved, those
that excel should be rewarded, and those lagging should be targeted for learning immersion or
removed from the ranks. Simultaneously, a study on what attributes and conditions lead to
positive and negative outcomes could inform future resources.
From Chapter 4, the research suggests that the Army not only has a self-development
problem, but also a developing others one. The Army needs to reevalute how it prepares officers
to develop those around them and at every level. This is not simply for soldiers, but
organizations too. Here is where a deficit in creativity and initiative might be reversed.
Research along these lines should specifically look at why the Army has ‘initiatve groups’ and
what value or initiative they actually create.
5.2.2 Reexamine Self-Development Resources
Boring. That is what this researcher thought when reviewing the long list of selfdevelopment resources available to officers and all soldiers (Appendix F). Some of these are
very good and informed by science, but others are outdated. Put bluntly, animated and clumsy
videos from 2000 will simply not compete with today’s realistic games and the expectations of
younger soldiers.
There is also a vast number of resources to consider. Without some direction, which we
know is lacking, where does a junior leader start? A relatively simple study could discover what

resources are at least interesting to varying cohorts. Other questions include: when in an officer’s
career are these introduced; how often are they accessed; and what value do they provide, which
bring us back to measuring and analytics?
5.2.3 Replicate this Research
As mentioned, the Army uses Likert-scales when measuring its people, and there is
nothing particularly wrong here. Still, soldiers have a lot more to say, and then there is how they
say it. The officers interviewed were very passionate about leading and the Army’s mission.
They did not simply, ‘neither agree or disagree’—they painted a colorful and service-informed
picture instead of a black dot. A study group should consider interviewing 100–150 officers and
also gather data from different officer cohorts. A case study on how overall leadership
development is developed and or measured would also be valuable.
Two other wars might also inform this research, and taken as a whole, might even
produce a solid theory. The Soviet’s 10-year war in Afghanistan in the 1980s is now 30-years
old, and it is obviously over. What came of their officer corps following its end? Did they face
similar problems, and if so, what did they do? The Soviet General Staff kept vast and meticulous
records. A relatively new war is still going on between Russia and Ukraine (that began in 2014).
Now six years in, has Ukraine had to take similar army expansion steps?
5.3 Summary
Not every futurist like Alvin Toffler gets it right, but if the conditions and impacts of
history inform it, then it is better than guessing what might come to be. I wish the results of this
research were different, but I am pleased to see that the Army is not standing still. The cascade of
blue boxes on the right of Figure 3 are accomplished leaders leaving the Army. I am confident
they will endeavor to make the lower red ovals disappear before they do. It might have been

serendipity that the figure ends in 2028, but today’s Army Vision states, “The Army of 2028 will
be ready to deploy, fight, and win decisively against any adversary, anytime and anywhere…
[with] exceptional Leaders and Soldiers of unmatched lethality” (DA, 2018). To this, I say,
“hooah!”

Figure 3 (Repeated). Cascading Impact of Time, War and Rank on Self-Development
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Appendix C: Army Leadership Requirement Model

Figure 1C. Army Leadership Requirments Model

Appendix D: Interview Questions
1. “Describe what comes to mind when you hear, ‘Army leader self-development domain?’”
• Do you know the ALDM?
• Is this something you ascribe to?
• What then, do you call it?
2. “Tell me about your self-development journey from commissioning to 2001.”
• How did your superiors encourage you to be better? In the Army? In life?
• What was the role of mentors – not bosses?
• What was your motivation to engage in such learning activities?
3. “For the past five or so years, what sorts of activities do you engage in that you consider selfdevelopment?”
• Do you impart these on your subordinates? How? Why?
• Has the role of mentors changed in your later service?
• What is your current motivation to better yourself? And others?
4. “What were the impediments to self-development activities while you were preparing for
deployment and deployed?”
• How did mentoring differing during this period?
• Did you sense a difference during high OPTEMPO times?
5. Given the importance the Army places on SD, I it putting ‘its money where its mouth is?’
6. “If the Army tasked you to improve the self-development domain in ALDM – what might you
do first?”
7. “Do you have anything thing else you think is important for me to understand about your selfdevelopment journey, or the state of the domain for the Army?
• What gauge, if any, do you ascribe to self-development in you and others?

Appendix E: Example Battalion Officer Development Program

The figure after the text is an actual battalion-level plan, and is better than most.
CONCEPT
1. Formal Instruction. Self-development is augmented by formal classes that provide additional
information on selected tactical and leader related topics. The training schedule will reflect these
classes. These classes will normally take two forms:
• Leader Team Training pertains to all officers covering general, non-tactical, and
professional topics.
• Nested Leader Training pertains to leaders two levels down from the sponsor
(lieutenants are the focus for battalion nested leader training). These cover tactical topics
along with conceptual, interpersonal, and technical skills.
2. Task List. To focus efforts for leader development, specific tasks for lieutenants are included
at enclosure 1. These tasks are designed to round out an officer’s development and facilitate
integration into the unit. They cover topics other than those normally associated with
accomplishing unit training. Lieutenants will work in conjunction with their company
commander or principal staff supervisor to complete these tasks successfully. As a goal, leaders
should complete these tasks within 90 days of assignment.
3. Counseling. Professional, routine, and goal-based counseling is an integral part of the
professional development process. Company commanders, principal staff officers, and the
battalion commander will execute counseling plans to ensure that individual goals are established
and professional assessments are provided. Enclosure 1 tasks should be used to develop
assessments and monitor professional development of junior officers. Performance counseling as
outlined in ATP 6-22.1 will occur according to battalion policy. Counseling will occur in the
officer’s work area, not the battalion commander’s office. Formal evaluation counseling will be
the exception. Officers should be prepared to discuss performance and future goals and
objectives. Officers should also be prepared to discuss their self-development program and unit
goals. Company commanders will arrange counseling sessions with the battalion commander
through the adjutant based on their training schedule. The counseling rotation schedule follows:
• Staff officers and HHC: January, April, July, October.
• Alpha & Charlie Companies: February, May, August, November.
• Bravo & Delta Companies: March, June, September, December.
4. Professional Reading. Professional reading is a valued part of self-development. There are
numerous recommended reading lists available. Additionally, technology (distance learning and
other web-based applications) allows the easy production and dissemination of training videos on
a variety of military-related topics. Additionally, several binders of instructional materials are
available for use and review in the S3 shop.

5. Mentorship. Nothing is more effective for professional development than a senior leader
taking personal interest in the development of a subordinate. Effective mentorship requires an
interested and receptive senior and an equally interested and receptive subordinate. It cannot be
forced or dictated. I cannot be virtue or rank or position simply state, “I am your mentor”. It is
much more complicated than that. Senior officers take an interest in junior officers by imparting
the benefit of their experience and knowledge. Junior officers should recognize this as a valuable
resource and seek opportunities to learn from more senior and experienced officers.
PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES
1. Battalion commander
• Serves as the primary trainer and teacher for lieutenants. Certifies that lieutenants are
proficient and can execute required tasks to standard.
• Plans and executes the battalion program with staff and company commander
assistance.
• Provides feedback to officers on their leader development progress.
• Manages assignment opportunities for lieutenants.
• Assists in development of assignment patterns for company and field grade officers.
2. Company commanders and principal staff officers
• Assistant trainer and teacher for lieutenants. Enable lieutenants in completing tasks to
standard.
• Provide feedback to junior officers on their leader development progress.
• Ensure newly assigned officers are briefed and enrolled in battalion programs.
• Authorized to expand the program into areas deemed necessary for advancement.
3. Individual officers
• Participate in Leader Team Training and Nested Leader Training.
• Develop, with your rater, an individual development plan.
• Lieutenants will complete certification tasks specified at enclosure 1. The goal for
completion of these tasks is within 90 days of assignment.
IMPLEMENTATION
This program is effective upon receipt of this memorandum. Many of the tasks listed at enclosure
1 may have already been completed by more senior lieutenants. In this case, rating officers
(commanders or principal staff) are authorized to grandfather the appropriate tasks.
CONCLUSION

Development of leaders is the most important thing we do. Our Soldiers deserve nothing less
than fully qualified leaders who understand and enforce high standards of mission
accomplishment.

Figure 1E. Example Battalion Program

Appendix F: Army Leader Development Resources
(https://usacac.Army.mil/core-functions/leader-development)

The Army Leader Development Program (ALDP) is the Army's Program for managing HQDA
approved leader development initiatives. The ALDP is the sole management process for program
execution, approval, incorporation of new initiatives, and recommendations for prioritization of
resources including the Army Leadership Development Strategy (ALDS). The ALDS provides
vision and guidance for developing leaders of all cohorts and components that exercise mission
command while executing unified land operations.
LeaderMap: LeaderMap provides information on how to shape and conduct leader
development. It is designed to help you increase the success of leader development for your unit,
your team, your followers, and yourself.
This tool brings to life key concepts from the FM 6-22 and other Army Doctrine on leadership.
Not all topics in the FM 6-22 are covered in this tool. For this reason, you should use LeaderMap
as a supplement to, not a replacement for the Army Doctrine on leadership. Select the links
below to access the complete versions of the Doctrine.
62nd Medical Brigade Professional Development Book: This Leader Professional
Development Booklet is for Senior NCOs and Detachment Sergeants. Every leader is strongly
encouraged to use and share the information within this booklet.
ARNG Leader Dev Strategy (LDS): The Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) builds
on our Army's experiences since the end of the Cold War including the past eight years of war in
Iraq and Afghanistan and on our assessment that the future operational environment will be even
more uncertain, complex, and competitive as hybrid threats challenge us across unified land
operations.
Asymmetric Warfare Group: The U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group provides operational
advisory and Solution Development support globally to the Army and Joint Force Commanders
to enhance Soldier survivability and combat effectiveness, and enable the defeat of current and
emerging threats in support of Unified Land Operations.
Asymmetric Warfare Group Adaptive Soldier and Leader Training and Education
(ASLTE): The ASLTE approach is a way to think and plan differently about how to conduct
outcome-oriented training and education that purposefully develops the 21st Century Soldier
Competencies necessary for operational adaptability.
ATP 6-22.1 THE COUNSELING PROCESS: Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 6-22.1
provides doctrinal guidance for all leaders, military and civilian, responsible for planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing counseling actions. Trainers and educators throughout the
Army will also use this publication.
Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) Resources: Cyber electromagnetic activities are
activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in

both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading
adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system (ADRP 3-0).
CEMA consist of cyberspace operations (CO), electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum
management operations (SMO). Army forces conduct CEMA as a unified effort. Integration is
the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as
a whole. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to
produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 1-02).
Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE): CAPE is the Army Force Modernization
Proponent for Army-wide Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) responsibilities to advance the Army Profession, its Ethic
and the Character Development of Army's professionals. Intent: Provide senior leaders with the
educational resources, narrative, and ideas to reinvigorate the Army Profession across all Army
cohorts. Enable the Army to refocus on the professional identity that motivates ethical behavior,
maintains high levels of competence, and enhances stewardship of the profession.
Commander's Handbook for Unit Leader Development: This handbook is designed to
provide commanders with an efficient and effective way to develop leaders. This handbook
draws on the input of successful Army commanders and non-commissioned officers, recent
Army leadership studies, research on effective practices from the private and public sectors, and
applicable Army regulations and doctrine.
Company Commander & First Sergeant Pre-Command Course: The Purpose of the
Company Commander/First Sergeant Pre-Command Course (CCFSPCC) is to provide company
command teams knowledge in key areas leading to effective leadership in garrison operations.
Developing Leadership During Unit Training Exercises: This handbook is designed to
provide O/T's and leaders in the chain of the command the tools and techniques needed to
identify and feed back to leaders what their leadership looks like and how it impacts Soldier
performance and mission accomplishment.
School for Command Preparation: School for Command Preparation (SCP) serves as lead
agent within the Command Team Preparation Program. SCP ensures that command preparation
programs remain compliant and relevant across and within each of the four phase program
through the Command Team Enterprise.
Doctrine Update Publications: The United States Army Combined Arms Center publishes the
Doctrine Update periodically to highlight recent and upcoming changes to doctrine and provides
information related to doctrine use. This Doctrine Update provides information on the overall
Doctrine strategy. This update is disseminated to the lowest level to maximize the understanding
of doctrine and the timelines of significant publications.
Institutional Training Management: The purpose of this page is to provide unit training
managers with an overview of how the Army programs and manages institutional training
Leader Developmental Improvements Guide June 2014: This Leader Development
Improvement Guide (LDI Guide) provides Army leaders at all levels with ideas and activities for

professional growth, development, and continuous learning that can be incorporated into an
Individual Development Plan (IDP) or used informally when a leader wants to improve in a
particular area. Leaders at all levels can use this guide as a handbook to jump start their ideas for
self development.
Mission Command Case Studies: This page provides commanders and leaders with principles
of mission command case studies suitable for use in Leader Development Programs.
Mission Training Complex-Joint Base Lewis-McChord Leadership Training and
Development: The MTC-JBLM's Leadership Training and Development page provides a
collection of videos and publications that leaders can use to enhance unit leadership training and
development. Videos include combat action lessons-learned, decision making exercises, battle
accounts, leaders talking about leadership, and many others. Publications include relevant
leadership professional development articles, leadership doctrine, and reading lists
Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback
Operation Winter Road: Path to Security: The Operation Winter Road video chronicles 1-38
IN battalion's combat operations and leadership lessons learned during their 2012-2013
deployment to the Panjwai District of Afghanistan. 1-38 Infantry's area of operations was
characterized by very complex terrain, was extremely kinetic, was a long time insurgent safe
haven, and was infested with hundreds of pressure plate anti-personnel IEDs. This video
documents how the Soldiers and Leaders adapted to the challenges of the environment, how the
battalion defeated the insurgents, secured the population, and turned over security responsibility
to Afghanistan forces. Highlighted leadership lessons included in the video are: Mission
Command; agility and adaptability; the importance of trust; rehearsals; leadership and
confidence; focusing on fundamentals; relationships; combined arms breaching; and counter IED
techniques.
Training Capabilities and Best Practices: The purpose of this page is to provide user-friendly
and intuitive access to the location, purpose, use, and TTPs or best practices for using Army
Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations.
U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List: The U.S. Army Chief of Staff's
Professional Reading List is divided into six categories: 1. Strategic Environment 2. Regional
Studies 3. History and Military History 4. Leadership 5. Army Profession 6. Fiction. These sublists are intended to steer readers to topics in which they are most interested. Each of these books
is suitable for readers of any rank or position.

Appendix G: Memorable Interview Quotes
Below are some additional and more memorable quotes from officers for different reasons.
Although they lack total context, I think you will get their point.
•

What we risk doing is just leaving behind that entire generation.

•

We had 12 people who thought exactly the same. They had the exact same experiences
through life.

•

I don't think I really got my act together until I was about 10 years into the Army.

•

During the height of the war, you didn't have to think very hard about how to deploy your
unit. There was a system already in place. You just got in line and did what they told you to
do on trackers… You just got in line, marched along like a good soldier.

•

I'll be sitting in my office with my feet up on my desk and he'll come walking in and he'll be,
"what are you doing?" "I'm reading." Well, "What do you mean you're reading." And I'm
like, "I'm reading. It's part of my job."

•

You get out of the force for two years, three years to go to graduate school, you come back
and then I say, "You don't have any operational experience, I won't promote you. Your file's
not good enough."

•

If I go to school, no OERs, don't get promoted, bad, don't get smarter. Don't gain any
knowledge. Don't think outside the box. Fall in line, kiss the boss's behind. Do what you got
to do to promote.

•

We've talked a lot about leader development, but how do we teach our leaders how to leader
develop?

•

Look, there's no easy button to success. There's no real fast pass. There's no accelerate
button. It's a lot of hard work and then you go through the paces of, yes, you have to read.

•

The one thing he realized as he was a four star…, that at the end of the day, no matter what
rank you achieve, the only thing you leave behind is the legacy that you leave in your
subordinates.

•

I think the older ones of us who are still around and we probably need to take a few minutes
and think about what is it that I wished I had known how to do and help pay that forward to
the group that's still here.

•

You got brigade commanders, now you have general officers. They do not know how to fight
properly and it's not their fault. When it was their time to be developed, we sent them to Iraq
and Afghanistan instead of learning how to attack in the field, which was the process we had.

•

If you are responsible for training and certifying subordinates two levels down and you don't
have that knowledge base, then who's doing it…?

•

I attribute my own personal self-development… [it] is absolutely decisive to the success I
had as an Army officer in terms of both personal career success.

•

I grabbed a manual and started reading it. I'm like, "Holy crap. They tell you how to do this!”

•

Is it called self-development if you force somebody to do it? Or that training?

•

When you're a leader in the Army, you're constantly involved in helping others do what they
need to do. And sometimes you don't do a great job of sitting back and doing what you think
you need to do.

•

If you don't point them in the right direction or give them a starting point or set conditions for
self-development to happen, it probably won't.

•

To some people being in the military is just a job…, they're not going to go out of their way.
They'll never do [self-development].

•

I get up early, come home late and rely really on my operational experiences. [They] have
provided the most of my development as an officer.

•

I just don't know that there are literally enough hours in the day for guys that are running
with the operational Army to have a meaningful outside of your work day, self-development
effort.

•

I can tell you just from walking down and engaging [with] people…, the ones who do selfdevelopment and the ones who don't… They can pull things together in a logic trail…
deconstruct arguments… unpack things.

•

I don't know that the army realizes what's happening around it.

Appendix H: Literature and Theory Map

I cannot attribute this map, but it captures the academic literature accurately. Found here:
https://cmapsconverted.ihmc.us/rid=1247634662671_308533138_15132/Self%20Directed%20L
earning.cmap

Figure 1H. Literature and Theory Map

Appendix I: Reflecting on 30 Years of Army Service: A Meassage to Leaders
This appendix is for Army cadets and new lieutenants. It’s relatively short and easy to read,
because you are busy – or should be. It’s for captains and majors too if you don’t already know,
or just need reminding. And it’s for lieutenant colonels, colonels and generals to pass along in
this form; or better yet, with some thoughts of your own. I suppose it is for all professionals as
well.
You are going to read about self-development below, and it will make you a better leader and
person. It’s one of three domains of leadership development, which is essential to your job, if not
your job altogether. Development like this does not have an end-point; it’s many-many points
overtime, and you will hear and read about leadership development as being “life-long.” You
will get plenty of skills from the other two domains (operational and institutional), but this is
simply not enough. If you have not found the start-point then keep reading, but know that you
will only get out of any domain what you put into it.
Think of leadership development as a three-legged stool. It won’t stand on two legs, and will fall
over if one or more legs gets too long. Overtime the legs lengths will vary, so be aware and take
actions to prevent it. The Army uses three circles that overlap to demonstrate how each domain
compliments the others. The overlap is where the “magic happens;” in that, something you learn
in one domain helps you solve or learn in another – and so on.
The Army expects that your bosses and leaders will guide you, and you will guide others soon
enough. Recall that “develops others” is an essential leader attribute. DON’T WAIT for them to
come to you. The ‘self’ part is crucial early in your Army service, because meaningful
development does not just happen. My research says it will naturally get better around your 10th
year of service, but don’t wait. This means you need to discover (or enhance) that intrinsic
motivation to excel as an officer and as person sooner. The Army also expects you will discover
this, with some help, but don’t plan solely on this boss, the next one, and the ones after these for
guidance.
Why? By no fault of their own, they may have various ideas how to develop you. Or maybe
none. Some will fail the task outright, but not even the Army can blame them. This domain and
the Army’s emphasis have historically ebbed and flowed in the macro sense. Individually, some
officers ascribe to it more than others, or simply because they had a head start and better guides.
The recent wars have degraded self-development in the Army. The development that did take
place was likely, and rightfully, on war-related tasks. There are times for laser focus, but you
cannot always be this way (or life-long).
The list of impediments to self-development is like sand grains on a beach, but there is one large
rock in the middle – TIME. I often quip, ‘time is like gold, so treat it that way.’ You can use,
‘there’s not enough time’ as an excuse not to engage in self-development activates, but you are
only lying to yourself and those around you. The Army should not blame time either, because
they are probably already limiting it for you. You cannot control all waking hours, but you can

with some. It is simply a decision to prioritize one thing over another. Prioritizing is basically
straight forward, and we do it all day long without really thinking about it.
Priority is routinely gauged by some value you attribute to things. The value of self-development
appreciates as time goes by, so you may not see much, if any value in it today. In this case, you
are wrong. No blame – I did it too, but wish I had gotten my game together sooner. You need to
prioritize self-development higher and now, because: 1) the Army has ordered you to do it, so be
a good Soldier, and 2) you will be a better leader and person. And, ‘better’ is simply better, and
who does not want that? Of course, ‘better’ is relative to some starting point before.
Where do I start? I would imagine you already have desire to improve because you wear boots to
work, but it is crucial to get more serious. By ‘crucial,’ I literally mean that lives depend on it.
Your strengths are already yours, and will likely improve by simply being you and over time.
Improving shortcomings should be your first priority, and since we all have them, it should be
easy. ‘Should,’ but it is not. Often times you are either blind to them, or frankly, lying to yourself
and probably because it makes you uncomfortable. And that boss might not want to bring it up
because of the same reasons (blind and uncomfortable). The Army’s 360-MASF is a great start.
The next thing to do is read. Science says your mental cognition – or how smart you are – has
very little to no bearing on your propensity to engage in self-development. So, no a leader has
any excuse not to get after this. For ten years I bemoaned reading, and basically read what I “had
to.” For me, my reading spark came via military history (Slim’s “Defeat into Victory,” it’s a
tough, but inspiring read). I suppose it did not have to be history, but this genre opened the door
to many others, and admittedly not all. Reading the same book at different times in your life is
also rewarding, because you gain new insights with ever increasing maturity and, well,
development. So read, and there are countless book-lists to choose from. If you don’t like some
book or article, try another as they will not run out. It may go without say, but you must read the
doctrine! Think of them as rules to a very serious game you do not want to lose. Prioritize your
reading.
Finally, and for this paper, is to find a mentor or several. You don’t need a compass, but a lot of
Soldiers don’t really understand mentoring. Read the doctrine. Actually, it’s not that much help,
since the rules for mentoring, in my experience, is sort of made as you go. It will be someone
you “click” with and respect – someone you can easily have a candid and honest conversation
with. You will have mentors for life-stuff and Army-stuff among other things. Having a
rewarding mentor-relationship only takes a little time and effort for both. And be a mentor to
others since it is rewarding.
I said this would be short. I hope you have three starter-tools in your leader ruck-sack, and you
will add to this over the years. If this did not make any sense to you, please talk to someone for
another perspective. Self-develop and lead on!

Appendix J: Sample of Codes, Categories and Themes
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

1st Order Code Examples
With self-development… sometimes I'm not even sure
what we're talking about
What we've done is sort of become a check the block
exercise
There's a mismatch between the intent of selfdevelopment and the desired outcome of selfdevelopment
I don't know that there are literally enough hours in the
day for guys… to have a meaningful outside of your
work day, self-development effort
There is a misconception among the force in terms of
what leader development as a whole means
Well, how is it being measured?
If the Army doesn't make it easy to do the right thing,
we're not going to do it.
I have heard leader development and self-development
for over a decade… and I have not seen an emphasis
put on it other than in words
The Army says a lot of things are important and
sometimes they follow through and sometimes they
don't
I don't know that the army realizes what's happening
around it.
Telling us to do self-development without providing the
resources such as time or opportunities is somewhat
hypocritical
If you're not going to measure it, then you can't say that
it's a priority
Without a forcing function, nothing in the army gets
done
Do I think that the resource allocation is out of
balance? Yes.
A good idea, poorly executed
A challenge for us institutionally is self-development
Non-existent
I think that we do a pretty much of a hand wave over
self-development
The first thing that goes overboard is self-development
There's a lot we could do to improve
An officer's motivation to develop himself further, it's
not really rewarded.
There's a lot of things you can do, but the value is not
put on it. It's not measured
1st Order Code Examples
We've talked a lot about leader development, but how
do we teach our leaders how to leader develop?
At the end of the day… the only thing you leave behind
is the legacy that you leave in your subordinates
I lead through teaching
He took a personal interest in me and my family

Categories

Themes

Leader
confusion /
frustration

Leader
blames the
Army

Institutional
Responsibility

It is a
problem

Categories
Importance
of
educational
agents

Themes

“Educational
Agents”

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What you don't see… [is] commanders and leaders
trying to enforce or encourage those types of activities
Back in the mid 90s… those officers were aware of
their responsibility to develop subordinates and they
got after it
I'm not the best at it either. I try to do the best I can with
it
My gut tells me that they're not. But maybe many of
them are. I'm just not seeing it.
We have a significant generational divide right now.
We've got a lot of young officers out there who are
really, really hungry for information. Their only problem
is they don't know what questions to ask, and they
don't know where to go.
We don’t tell them what that self-development looks
like, other than to say work on your weaknesses
There is a good core of people who can do it… [and]
there are people who are not doing it at all... some of it
is because they're unable personally
If you don't point them in the right direction or give
them a starting point or set conditions for selfdevelopment to happen, it probably won't.
Just by mathematics there's less people there to codify
and develop the profession's technical knowledge. As
that gets eroded and by extension you're going to see
a degradation of what the standard is for professional
development.
Don't have those above your or laterally that you want
to help and create this mindset of self-development
and lifelong learning.
1st Order Code Examples
In a unit getting ready to deploy and you're working 16
hour days, or 18 hour days or whatever
But this idea that we're overloaded with tasks, there's
not much time to do things like self-development
As soon as, of course, the wars kicked in, there didn't
seem to be much time.
That was spent almost exclusively learning the
geography, the train, the groups, and then the technical
specifics of how to do my job
Then after deployment, I didn't get back into it, unless
that after the deployment is you got nine months to go
back.
Your scope became so narrow that every step had
before going to war, was focused on that
There wasn't any self-development going on brother
When it was their time to be developed, we sent them
to Iraq and Afghanistan instead of learning how to
attack in the fed, which was the process we've had.
Your self-development time was limited because you
were on a fast train.
Everything was handed to us during that period. During
the height of the war, you didn't have to think very hard
about how to deploy your unit. There was a system

It is a
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already in place. You just got in line and did what they
told you to do on trackers
I can do it in three words. Lack of time.
I think the point where we were tired enough, we just
got lazy and said, "You know, this Army says we have
to have this. It must be good enough. That's all I need."
When you did the war, first of all, the hours are
crushing
Getting access to relevant information.
Let's say circa 2003, 2004, it was simply access to
information and understanding of what was going on,
Just access to a lot of those things.
I was at a loss a lot of the time, I couldn't find the right
things.
In deployment it's a little hard talk about selfdevelopment.
Your self-development time was limited because you
were on a fast train
The only impediment during deployment is… very
limited time… so, it becomes a competition for that
most pressure for resource of time
When it was their time to be developed, we sent them
to Iraq and Afghanistan instead of learning
The high tempo itself was a major barrier because
everybody was so busy doing all the things that
needed to be done. They really didn't have much extra
bandwidth to be doing nice to have things.
I spent a lot of nights… where it was 10:30, 11:00 at
night before I'd be done and it was just easier to just
sleep at the office
We're over-structured and undermanned as an
organization, so giving people back time is going to be
difficult because that's how we compensate has an org,
as an Army by being over-structured and
undermanned.
It seemed like I hit a deployment every time I started
one [master’s program].
I think it was that the big impediment is just the volume
of tasks that need to be accomplished as you're
preparing for deployment… we get so task-infatuated
I've got a working wife and 4 kids, so most of my time
is taken up by them
I can do it in three words. Lack of time
Today in terms of ubiquity of smartphones, and
laptops, and all the other things that just constantly are
sucking away at your time or biding for your time.
I moved every year for seven years straight. When I
wasn't moving, I was deployed. A lot of times it was
unfeasible to really get after it
I try to still do some reading, but unfortunately I just find
myself more and more distracted for a whole host of
reasons.
We don't give officers time to reflect as much
Time constraints and requirements
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When you're in a daily grind, it's hard to step back and
reflect on who you are and where you want to be
So the whole notion that we've had time sucks
Time. Well, time and where you pay for that is you
don't have time to reflect
Time to get it done and time to evaluate it, and time to
get feedback on it. Those key and critical opportunities
get tossed overboard
In church I will say, we did have the opportunity while
deployed to do more spiritual reflection and in time,
having some meaningful internal moral dialogue
As long as readiness is our number one priority, then
it's hard to say self-development outside of the narrow
band of immediate readiness is important because the
time demands on readiness mean I only have so much
time
Overwhelmed with tasks and we don't do a very good
job of prioritizing
Then of course cost, we reduced the number of
courses available, we changed instructor student ratio.
You go from small group, collegiate level
discussion/interaction to one over the world, large
group instruction
In this current job I have, I think I do it less. It's a matter
of time
You have to balance so many things and you have to
take care of your unit…, yourself…, the organization.
So I think you just run out of time
There's a lot of things you can do, but the value is not
put on it. It's not measured.
1st Order Code Examples
I, get up early, come home late and rely really on my
operational experiences to, have provided the most of
my development as an officer
Haven't had the time between family and operational
assignments and deployments
OPTEMPO when I was in operational units was so
hard or fast that there was really almost no
opportunities for self-development
For guys that are running with the operational army to
have a meaningful outside of your work day, selfdevelopment effort
They certainly put their money where their mouth is
operationally
And operationally, it absolutely does.
You can't entrust [SD] to the senior rater or the rater
cause all they're focused on is maximizing the value of
that officer for the good of the operational assignment
they're in den.
We were so busy just focused on doing our mission
I would say that it's operationally focused
I do credit the army with my institutional development. I
would say it's probably vastly exceeded what I thought
I would get throughout my career
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By and large, if I reflect back on my Captain's Career
Course, did it prepare me for what was to follow in my
career? I think, and the answer is, absolutely, yes, it
did. Did SAMS and did CTSD prepare me for services
as field grade officer in most areas? Yeah. Yes. So I
think they were effective.
The army does invest in its service members at grade
throughout the long arc of their careers, in educational
opportunities
The education I got at the War College was one of the
best educations I ever received
PME is the foundation
When it was their time to be developed, we sent them
to Iraq and Afghanistan instead of learning how to
attack in the fed, which was the process we've had.
I used PME and the institutional domain, all the older
courses I'd been to, to just sort of build upon that
The institutional domain's like going to the gym every
day. And then all of a sudden, once you leave the
institutional domain, you stop going to the gym.
There's incredible pressure on personnel and cost. The
pressure of personnel and cost has further reduced the
institute. We can't have as big a TTHL account so we
shorten the number of school days.
Then of course cost, we reduced the number of
courses available, we changed instructor student ratio.
You go from small group, collegiate level
discussion/interaction to one over the world, large
group instruction
1st Order Code Examples
I’d like to think I've read books that have caused me to
grow, change my opinion and some of those thought
processes
We tried to encourage leaders to read
A lot of different reading assignments that covered
leadership, MacArthur, and some other things
Books on learning theory or philosophy that would've
given me greater depth rather than just technical
knowledge
By and large, it comes from professional readings
A lot of things you learn throughout trial and error, trial
by fire, which are all good. I mean, you get the reps
under your belt
It was fairly effective because it was, I won't say
regimented, but it was at least structured and had a
recurring internal company OPDs that then led to
battalion OPDs. They really built on each other and
they required the officers that were given the
instruction to do all the preparation
It's effective and a means that brings everybody
together
She's somebody who pushed me to do better for
myself academically, and professionally, and
personally to learn and grow over time
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It was the bottom up kind of spark that got people to
start a mentorship or a process by which we then for a
period of time... And again, it's really leader driven
Probably the most influential man in my life outside of
members of my own family. There's no doubt in my
mind, I would not be where I am today, if not for him
I've been blessed with some really good mentors
I think one of the other mentors for me is my father
I've been very fortunate to have some solid mentors
That relationship grew from good leadership to
mentorship. …invested a lot of energy into me… [the]
majority of it was a direct focus on my selfdevelopment… pushing read…, to write more
So, you almost have to entrust self-development to
mentors
1st Order Code Examples
I would say the first 10 years it was no
There was a lot of transition of people in positions
preventing me from really getting a lot of mentorship
from my senior leadership
Then you have other leaders who maybe were never
mentored themselves or never really fully grasped or it
just wasn't within their personality profile to be maybe a
good mentor
Also the mentorship that a lot of people in the military
probably say that they don't receive.
In general the candid feedback is missing
I personally don't necessarily have anyone that I call a
mentor
No. None. That was pretty easy
Mentorship, what do we mean when we say
mentorship?
Nor was I emphasized at any point from any of my
leaders or senior leaders in any discussions I had with
them
I don't think they really did. I had very few people who
are senior to me who did take anything interest in it at
all. They were pretty much laissez faire
Do we have leaders who are self-developed
themselves or have a heavy educational background to
actually be good mentors?
There's no particular leader of mine, company
commanders, field grades, anything like that, that
encouraged [me]
No, and it's been that way my entire career
I've got to admit, especially when I was a junior officer,
I never really experienced a "mentor". I read about it,
heard about it, and never really felt like I ever had a
formal mentor per se
I came into the Army in '93, until now, I was told about
mentors… that I should cultivate a mentor or two…
And I didn't take that advice
I just didn't experience it [mentoring] myself at an early
age
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Oh, mentors. That's a sore subject for me. I would not
say that... I did not have any mentors in my basic
branch
I think by the time I figured out what I wished I had
known when I was younger, I just resolved that I would
do that [mentoring] for other people
Mentorships one of these things the army's always
talked about [went on to bash it]
Where you have senior officers who didn't do any kind
of mentoring or any type of self-development help for
junior officers
Unless I went out of my way to go find one there sure
wasn't anybody volunteering to mentor me… I don't
think I really got my act together until I was about
10 years into the Army because of that [heard
often]
I'd say he was almost anti-intellectual [that I was] being
a little too bookish
He's actually asked me point blank, how do you find
time to read?
I could read 20 slides or a 40 page paper. I can say,
yep, check the block. I read it (did not understand it)
I don't know anybody… that's home before 7, so if
you're going home and you're not a warrior monk
The field grade officers recognize the value, but the
junior, the company grade officers, we didn't get it,
I'm infinitely more self-aware, and I think that increased
every year of my life. Meaning they were not before
It was limited.
And I failed to take the advice that I was given when I
first came in and that has been to my detriment. And so
I wish I would have done what I was told in that regard
What I didn't see was that those relationships early in
my career would continue to influence me for the next
20 years plus in ways I couldn't even imagine [why]...
because I was an immature, younger officer and as far
as I was concerned, I was probably getting out after
company command.
I think myself as a major or a lieutenant colonel, I
wasn't completely self-aware. It's taken me a long time
to become self-aware, and to better know what my
strengths and weaknesses are
I really wasn't into the self-development domain too
much
I don't think self-development was a thing back then as
far as something that were pushing.
We do a pretty much of a hand wave over selfdevelopment. I felt that pretty much my whole career,
we talk about it, but I don't think that we...
it's like I did as a young major, we really understand all
the different dynamics and variables that we're dealing
with.
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I don't see the rewards on the back end, the
confirmation from the senior leaders when it's been
done and done well, there is no reward
There would have to be some sort of outward signs
that the culture can then see as a benefit of selfdevelopment.
I think the Army says a lot of things that they mean, but
they don't really reinforce and they don't really reward
It's more of the carrot versus the stick kind of thing
I'm more interested in things that are going to engage
me for my lifetime
An officer's motivation to develop himself further, it's
not really rewarded.
Self-development is not part of that reward system, if
that makes sense.
For some people it'll be incentives. If they get a
master's degree on their own or they do something on
the own does that increase their promotion potential, to
get recognized
I thought would give me a market advantage in
understanding my job.
I did the minimum to get done with ILE, because to me
there was no incentive to be the honor graduate.
Adults won't learn or won't invest as much in learning if
they don't see the utility in what it is they're being
taught
I don't see the rewards on the back end, the
confirmation from the senior leaders when it's been
done and done well, there is no reward.
So again, there was no incentive
I mean, we know what our weaknesses are. The
difference is, leaders that excel are ones that do
something about it
If a soldier or officer doesn't realize that they have a
deficiency and there's no assessment that happens up
front, it's really challenging for them to then come up
with a plan on how to fix that, or at least on how to
improvement it.
If you had done 360 20 years ago - Oh, it would've
been phenomenal
I certainly would have benefited from that kind of 360
assessment and you know, meaningful insight into
career management, as a Lieutenant captain
And there was no feedback loop from somebody to
say, "Hey, we really needed you to do that."
Make them all come up with a self development plan
and we capture that on their support forms for their
counseling.
Make them pick one, the leadership dimension that
they're weakest at, or that they need to improve the
most, and then they come up with a concrete way to
improve that facet of their leader core competencies.
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We're required to counsel our subordinates. And what
we do, the program gives us a lot of latitude. We can
go, essentially, pretty minimal.
1st Order Code Examples
So I needed to up my game because if I was going to
execute in my chosen profession, I needed to be at
least as good as, if not better than my peers going
forward. And that was my whole motivation was, "Hey,
you got to be the best you can be."
I had to pursue that and compete for a slot to get into
that
I competed for, and was selected to attend, the
Advanced Strategic Arts Program
Well I would say it was kind of an inherent, may it might
not have come from a great place, but it came from a
competitive place
How can I gain those little, that little advantage, that
niche advantage
If you really want to get ahead, you need to get your
ass in a school because that's going to be a big boost
to your evaluation criteria
You kind of get this sense of wanting to keep up with
the Joneses.
I wanted to be better than, than the peers.
I thought would give me a market advantage in
understanding my job.
It was unhealthy, but, it was, I think from a good place.
It was competition
It came from a competitive place
I wanted to be better than, than the peers.
If I'm not learning something from someone every day I
feel like I've lost ground
And all of a sudden, at the lieutenant level, it just
clicked for me
How do you impart the next step, the spark that you
have?
I just was open to input from everybody around me,
from above, my peers and below.
It only takes a little bit to spark that fire under them and
to get them on that path of just consuming any and
everything that they can to grow
I don't think a lot of folks have something or have an
event that sparks that desire in them to really put that
self-development aspect of it in overdrive.
I realized pretty quickly there was a whole aspect to
warfare that I flat out did not understand
And that is really what encouraged me to continue to
grow and develop, watching other folks as they were
going through their own developmental journey.
But it was just that spark and what I learned coming out
of that, I had that same self-development spark as
those that I'd seen years before.
I think in my experience it was a series of epiphanies.
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I can remember reading those and it was just like this
magical light bulb came on…. And it was incredible
Probably influenced and informed by the peers around
me
Has been the peers that I've interacted with in the army
Most of the inspiration for that came from peers, not
from superiors or juniors.
Watching other folks as they were going through their
own developmental journey.
Most of the inspiration for that came from peers, not
from superiors or juniors.
Peers, for sure. Particularly, as majors and lieutenant
colonels.
"Wow." I'm a much better officer today as a result of
this motivation than I would have been if I wasn't
surrounded with people like that.
The greatest inspiration for me, given where I came
from in terms of self-development has been the peers
that I've interacted with in the army.
What are those skills or attributes that you admire in
others that you maybe don't see in yourself that you'd
like to learn more about?
Creates a mental conflict where people who should
consider professional development and selfdevelopment as part of their job see it as something
that is addition to their job
I thought that being an academic institution and most of
the professors here are PhDs that it would be good for
me and good for the institution if I work towards a PhD
I didn't have to do it, but I wanted to do it because out
of pride, I think, partially. But also I thought as an army
officer, if you're offered an opportunity to take a course
I have duties that require me to do a lot of reading and
writing on my own
If you're going to be an expert in any subject, you have
to stay abreast of the different perspectives and
discussions that are in the field
Being a team player is more important than being
number one.
So mine was always job based, right?
"Oh my goodness, I don't truly understand how to
synchronize fires. I do not truly understand everything I
need to know about my profession."
I decided to do it on my own, because I was very
uncomfortable in the unit that I was in because I didn't
understand the language that they were speaking
professionally,
be tactically and technically proficient. So how do I
develop that? And it was for me just to read, to gain the
experience vicariously,
"I'm reading. It's part of my job."
Another way of describing what we've always been
expected to do, which is continue your own
professional development
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I don't care what field you're in, you're expected to do
that
I always thought it was incumbent upon me,
I thought it was important that I know what the heck I
was doing
Every soldier should be a lifelong learner and has a
responsibility, an inherent responsibility, to continue to
develop themselves,
Not just prudent for the profession, but also for me, to
be a professional, to self-develop from commissioning
onwards
I'm not comfortable that I understand fully why or how
the operational strategic level works
tend to be self-motivated.
My PhD was a huge investment of mine on my own
personal development and my own self-development.
No one forced me to go.
I'm self-disciplined to do it, and two, I have the time or
make the time to follow it.
I wanted to be a leader that would make a difference.
I read a book a week, which has been a struggle. But
now that I do it, the discipline's there
Ability to make a difference and be a part of something
So a lot of it what's our passion?
The Army hasn't done enough to help shape people's
curiosity for developing themselves.
It has to be interesting to you
That's because we're individually curious and we care
That conversation fascinated me to death
Naturally curious person
It's been innate in me
Individual curiosity I think is a big deal
been naturally curious, and that led me to explore
issues, ideas, challenges on my own and become a
self-learner
other people are motivated just by natural curiosity,
and you just got to find those theories that they're
curious about and encourage them to explore them
and maybe give them opportunities to explore that
What can I do to be better? What a I need to better
myself? How do I expand my mind?
There's a nexus between mentorship and people who
desire mentorship, and people who are inquisitive
about themselves, about how they can improve
themselves and improve others.
The amount of curiosity that they have of just the world
around them.
By reading, being inquisitive,
Then you'll have the extraordinary 10% that are super
curious and will take care of themselves and others.
That's just normal.
Some people who are predisposed towards it, so your
low hanging fruit are those people who are probably
naturally curious people.
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But we don't look at the other aspects of an individuals
competencies and attributes and assess them the
same way and then come up with a plan to develop
them
Something that we have to introduce formally to them
So essentially individuals are making it up largely on
their own.
But are we really teaching them how to leader
develop?
It's a badge of honor to be able to say, "I don't know
how to do that." "Good. I'm glad you don't know how to
do that because we're going to teach you."
Whether it be counseling, coaching, mentoring, those
type things in order to inspire in them that will and that
desire to want to self-develop.
Spend time helping people understand the utility and
making clear the utility of why they're learning what
they're learning, in real ways that they can understand
and internalize. Not just telling them they're learning
this because it's important for them to learn.
Back in the mid-90s I think our professional officer
course did a good job of providing that direction
So I've gotten older, I've decided that I want to read
sometimes a little bit less of what I think the army
wants me to read and a little bit more of what I want to
read
Why am I here? What did I do differently? And how can
I help other people look at problems? Because I get
that now.
You got to really look in the mirror one morning, and be
like, all right.
I think in my experience it was a series of epiphanies.
I don't think I really got my act together until I was
about 10 years into the Army because of that.
I tribute my own personal self-development is
absolutely decisive to the success I had as an Army
officer in terms of both personal career success
When I was a junior officer, I was somewhat skeptical
of that and I am no longer
I think the older ones of us who are still around and we
probably need to take a few minutes and think about
what is it that I wished I had known how to do and help
pay that forward to the group that's still here that
It wasn't until probably at [inaudible 00:04:28] as a
senior captain after command that I realized I need to
start back in an educational loop for improving myself.

Develop
others

Reflecting
on past
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I'd start at PME
What about like a sabbatical? Something like that?
You almost have to cut out time and make it mandatory for all units to do
that
There's this phenomenon emerging, and it's predominantly powered by
social media, where you have groups of officers and groups of
professionals getting together to discuss and debate things. It's almost
like a social media powered, small group, if that makes sense.
I'd probably cull the number of books on the Army reading list
Then I'd want to go to a cohort of senior folks, and ask a series of real,
introspective questions of these cohorts of people, to gain an assessment
Disconnect it from the Army and say your self-development is based off of
you
Part of that is trust. We've got to start trusting our junior leaders more
You have to either outsource it or come up with the retirees, and maybe
that is the outsourcing solution?
Carve out space in an officer's career, so they have more time for selfdevelopment, so they're not always trying to get the next ticket punched
We really got to understand people and how they learn and what's going
to work and then teach leaders to understand and recognize that
Your cookie cutter approach won't necessarily work but then how can you
modify and then tailor it so that you do get the max output for what we're
putting into self-development and trying to, how do you create that spark?
The better we can get at trying to articulate or communicate [SD]
We have a hard time in the Army, because of how slowly we move, in
terms of trying to make this interesting to younger officers
Set a different, maybe learning model and different experiential
opportunities
Much more flexible leader development model
They had the luxury back then, in the mid war years, of long assignments
A recognition that people learn in different ways
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Appendix M: Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACT

Army Career Tracker

ADP

Army Doctrine Publication

ALDM

Army Leader Development Model

ALDP

Army Leader Development Program

ALDS

Army’s Leadership Development Strategy

AR

Army Regulation

ARI

Army Research Institute

ATLD

Army Training and Leader Development

ATP

Army Techniques and Procedures

CSA

Chief of Staff of the Army

CASAL

Center for Army Leadership’s Survey of Army Leadership

DA

Department of the Army

DOD

Department of Defense

FM

Field Manual

LDTF

Leader Development Task Force

LPD

Leader Professional Development

LTC

Lieutenant Colonel

MSAF

Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback

NCO

Non-Commissioned Officers

OCS

Officer Candidate School

OPD

Officer Professional Development

PRO

Personal Responsibility Orientation (model)

RIF

Reduction in Force

ROTC

Army’s Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

SD

Self-development

USMA

United States Military Academy

